.
PONTIKI COAL CORPORATION
KENT 94-1274-D
February 6, 1995


         FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

               OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
                      2 SKYLINE, 10TH FLOOR
                        5203 LEESBURG PIKE
                  FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA  22041


                         February 6, 1995


SECRETARY OF LABOR,             : DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDING
  MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH        :
  ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),        : Docket No. KENT 94-1274-D
  ON BEHALF OF CHARLES H.       : PIKE CD 94-16
  DIXON, BERNARD EVANS,         :
  RICHARD GLOVER, EDGAR OLDHAM, :
  MARK MARCH, AND ELEVEN (11)   :
  UNNAMED EMPLOYEES OF PONTIKI  :
  COAL CORPORATION,             :
               Complainant      :
          v.                    : Pontiki No. 2 Mine
                                : Mine ID 15-09571
PONTIKI COAL CORPORATION,       :
               Respondent       :

                 ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL DISMISSAL

Before:  Judge Melick

     This  proceeding  is  before  me  based  upon the Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss raising the following issues:  (1) the Commission
lacks  jurisdiction in this case over those persons  who  have  not
filed complaints under Section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1977, 3- U.S.C. � 801 et. seq., the "Act" and in
cases whether  such complaints have merit (under Sections 105(c)(2)
and (3) of the Act);  (2)  that  the  complaint of Charles H. Dixon
must also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction  because he was not
a member of a class of persons protected under Section  105(c) when
the  alleged  discrimination  occurred;  (3) that the complaint  is
defective under Commission Rule 44(a), 29  C.F.R. � 2700.44(a); and
(4) that the complaint herein is untimely.[1]


     The  undisputed  record shows that Charles  H.  Dixon,  alone,
filed a complaint of discrimination  pursuant  to section 105(c)(2)
of   the   Act[2]   on  April  26,  1994,  alleging  the  following
discriminatory actions:

     Pontiki Coal Corporation, through and by management
     personnel, advised miners that they could not choose a
     representative of miners who was a representative of the
     United Mine Workers of America.  The miners were further
     advised that if they chose a UMWA representative that
     Pontiki would be forced to spend thousands of dollars to
     defend their position and that only employees of Pontiki
     will be recognized as a representative of miners.

     Management for Pontiki, on or about March 11, 1994, further
     implied that the miners' jobs would be less secure as a
     result of the company having to spend thousands of dollars
     to defend their position and that if the company was not
     forced to spend this money on lawyers that it would mean
     more money for them.

     Management for Pontiki on April 15, 1994, properly received
     by certified mail, pursuant to 30 C.F.R. [sic] part 40 a
     certificate of representation of which they have failed to
     properly recognize.

     In  a  letter  to Mr.  Dixon  dated  September  15,  1994  the
Secretary advised Dixon in relevant part as follows:

     Your complaint of  discrimination, under section 105(c) of the
     Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, has been
     investigated and the results carefully considered.

     Based on the results  of  this  investigation, the Mine Safety
     and Health Administration (MSHA)  has  determined that, in its
     opinion, a violation of section 105(c) of the Act has
     occurred and that you have been discriminated  against.  MSHA,
     through the Office of the Solicitor, has prepared and filed  a
     complaint  on your behalf, requesting that Federal Mine Safety
     and Health Review  Commission  order relief which would remedy
     the discrimination.

     Thereafter,  September  6,  1994,  presumably   under  section
105(c)(2)   of  the  Act,  the  Secretary  filed  a  complaint   of
discrimination with this Commission alleging in part as follows:

     5.  The  following  non-employees  of Pontiki Coal Corporation
     have  been  appointed  as duly authorized  representatives  of
     miners for the Pontiki No.  2  mine  all within the meaning of
     section 105(c) of the Act [30 U.S.C. 815(c)]:  Charles Dixon,
     Bernard  Evans,  Don Riley, Charles Johnson,  Richard  Glover,
     Edgar Oldham, and  Mark March.  Said representatives of miners
     were appointed by eleven employees of Pontiki Coal Corporation
     working at the Pontiki No. 2 mine.

     6.   From March 1994  to present, Pontiki Coal Corporation has
     discriminated  against  the  non-employee  representatives  of
     miners and the eleven Pontiki  Coal  Corporation employees who
     appointed said non-employee miners' representatives.  The acts
     of discrimination are in violation of  section  105(c)  of the
     Act [30 U.S.C. 815(c).  The acts of discrimination engaged  in
     by Pontiki Coal Corporation include but are not limited to the
     following:
     (a)  refusal to recognize the non-employees as representatives
     of miners;  (b)  posting the appointment notice with the names
     of the  non-employees  representatives  of  miners on the mine
     bulletin  board  with  the  admonishment  that  Pontiki   Coal
     Corporation  would  not  recognize or honor the appointment of
     non-employees  as miners' representatives;  and  (c)   holding
     meetings with hourly  paid  employees,  to  include the eleven
     employees  described above, and threatening said  hourly  paid
     employees with  job  termination  by  closing the mine if said
     employees continued their efforts to appoint  non-employees as
     representatives of miners.[3]

     In its motion to dismiss, Pontiki argues, inter alia, that the
Secretary  cannot  bring  a  complaint on behalf of non-complaining
individuals. Indeed, under the  plain  language of that section, it
is  only  that  particular "miner or applicant  for  employment  of
representative  of   miners"   who   believes   that  he  has  been
discriminated against who is authorized and has standing  to file a
complaint  with  the Secretary alleging such discrimination against
him.

     The initiating complaint filed with the Secretary in this case
was clearly identified  as the complaint of Charles H. Dixon. He is
the  only  listed  named complainant  and  only  Dixon's  signature
appears  on  the complaint.   Moreover,  the  Secretary's  findings
pursuant to section  105(c)(2) evidenced by its letter to Mr. Dixon
dated  September  15,  1994  specifically  refers  to  Mr.  Dixon's
complaint as "your complaint  of  discrimination" and refers to the
findings  that "you have been discriminated  against".   There  is,
accordingly,  no legal basis for the Secretary's expanded complaint
filed with this  Commission  alleging  discrimination  against  the
named  complainant  herein,  Charles  Dixon,  but  also  as against
persons  other  than Charles Dixon. There being no statutory  basis
for the inclusion  of  the  17 additional persons in the complaint,
this  Commission  has  no  jurisdiction  to  act  on  the  expanded
complaint.  The complaint herein must accordingly be dismissed with
respect to all purported Complainants except Charles H. Dixon.[4]

     Moreover, to the extyend  that  the Secretary's complaint also
contains allegations naming additional  "complainants"  and  raises
additional  issued  thereby  deviating  from the original complaint
filed by Dixon with the Secretary on April 26, 1994 those deviating
and  additional  allegations must also be stricken  as  beyond  the
scope of this Commission's  jurisdiction.  Hatfield versus Colquest
Energy, Inc., 13 FMSHRC 544 (1991).

     With respect to the one remaining complainant, i.e.
Charles H. Dixon, Pontiki also  argues  that  he  was  not a person
protected under section 105(c) because he was not an applicant  for
employment,  a  miner  or  even  a  miner's representative when the
alleged discrimination occurred.  It  is  undisputed  in  this case
that  complainant Dixon has not, in fact, been either a "miner"  or
an "applicant  for  employment"  within the meaning of the Aact and
that he did not, until April 15, 1994  notify Pontiki of this claim
to be a "representative of miners" at the subject mine when Pontiki
received  by  certified  mail  a  "certificate  of  representation"
purportedly under 30 C.F.R. Part 40.   It is clear, therefore, that
before  April 15, 1994,Mr. Dixon was not  a  miner,  applicant  for
employment, or representative of miners within the scope of section
105(c)(2).

     Under the circumstances, I am without jurisdiction to consider
any alleged acts of discrimination occurring before April 15, 1994.
In examining the specific issues set forth in Mr. Dixon's April 26,
1994 complaint  to  the Secretary it is clear, therefore, that only
that part of Dixon's Complaint may be considered which asserts that
"management for Pontiki  on  April  15,  1994  properly received by
certified mail pursuant to 30 C.F.R. [sic] Part 40 a certificate of
representation of which they have failed to properly recognize."

     Pontiki further argues that Dixon was not a "representative of
miners"  and is still not a "representative of miners"  because  of
his failure  to comply with Part 40 of the Secretary's regulations.
In  this regard  Pontiki  notes  that  30  C.F.R.  section  40.3(a)
provides  for  mandatory  requirements for certification, requiring
that the certificate provide the title of the official or position,
who is to serves as representative and his or her telephone number.
The regulation specifically provides as follows:

     Section 40.3(a)  The following information shall be filed by a
     representative  of  miners   with   the  appropriate  District
     Manager, with copies to the operators  of  the affected mines.
     This information shall be kept current:

     (1)   The   name,   address   and  telephone  number  of   the
     representative  of  miners.   If  the   representative  is  an
     organization, the name, address, and telephone  number  of the
     organization and the title of the official or position, who is
     to  serve  as  the  representative  and  his  or her telephone
     number.

     The   Secretary   responds  by  claiming  the  allegation   is
"hypertechnical" but also  maintains  that the required information
has  been  provided.  There appears, therefore,  to  be  a  factual
dispute  on  the   issued  of  compliance  with  the  certification
requirements and that  issue cannot be resolved without evidentiary
hearings.

     The Respondent further  maintains that the Complaint should be
dismissed  as  untimely.  It is  undisputed  that  Dixon's  initial
Complaint was received  by  the  Secretary  on April 26, 1994.  The
Complaint  was not filed with this Commission  until  September  2,
1994, some 129  days  later.  The Secretary's written determination
that Dixon had been discriminated against, which also states that a
complaint had already been  filed  at the Commission on his behalf,
was dated September 15, 1995.  This  filing delay exceeded the time
limits set forth in section 105(c)(3) of the Act.  However, as this
time limit is not jurisdictional, a hearing will also be needed for
the parties to present evidence on the issues of whether such delay
was justified and whether the operator  has been prejudiced by such
delay.  Oral argument will also be held at  such  hearings  on  the
issued  of  whether the Secretary has complied with Commission Rule
44(a) and, if not, what sanctions should be imposed.

                              ORDER


     The Complaint  herein,  insofar  as  it  purports  to  name as
individual  Complainants  persons  other than Charles H. Dixon,  is
dismissed.  The Complaint of Charles H. Dixon is further limited as
provided in this Order.

     Hearings will be scheduled in the  near  future  on the issues
presented  in  the  motions to dismiss which have not been  decided
herein.



                              Gary Melick
                              Administrative Law Judge




Distribution:

Brian W. Dougherty, Esq.,  Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department
of Labor, 2002 Richard Jones Rd., Suite B-201, Nashville, TN 37215


Timothy M. Biddle, Esq., Thomas  C.  Means, Esq., Crowell & Moring,
1001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.  20004

/jf

**FOOTNOTES**

     [1]:The Secretary's Motion for Summary  Decision on the merits
filed January 13, 1995, is premature as the Motions  to Dismiss may
be dispositive on preliminary issues.  The Secretary's  Motion also
appears to be based upon facts still at issue.  See Commission  Rle
67, 20 C.F.R. � 2700.67.

     [2]:Section 105(c)(2) provides, in part, as follows:

          Any  miner  or applicant for employment or representative
of miners who believes  that  he  has  been  discharged, interfered
with, or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation
of this subsection may, within 60 days after such violation occurs,
file  a complaint with the Secretary alleging such  discrimination.
Upon receipt  of such complaint, the Secretary shall forward a copy
of  the  complaint   to   the   respondent  and  shall  cause  such
investigation   to   be  made  as  he  deems   appropriate.    Such
investigation shall commence  within  15  days  of  the Secretary's
receipt  of  the  complaint, and if the Secretary finds  that  such
complaint  was  not frivolously  brought,  the  Commission,  on  an
expedited basis upon  application of the Secretary, shall order the
immediate reinstatement  of  the  miner  pending final order on the
complaint.   If upon such investigation, the  Secretary  determines
that the provisions  of the subsection have been violated, he shall
immediately file a complaint with the Commission, with service upon
the alleged violator and  the  miner,  applicant for employment, or
representative   of   miners   alleging   such  discrimination   or
interference and propose an order granting appropriate relief.

     [3]:On  October  2,  1994,  the  Secretary  filed  an  amended
complaint  adding  a specific request for  assessment  of  a  civil
penalty of $1,500 for the alleged violation.

     [4]:The case caption in future pleadings should accordingly be
modified  to  reflect   the   deletion   of  these  17  persons  as
Complainants herein.