# FEBRUARY 1986

## Commission Decisions

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The following cases were granted for review during the month of February:

Secretary of Labor, MSHA v. NACCO Mining Company, Docket Nos. LAKE 85-87-R, LAKE 86-2. (Judge Merlin, January 14, 1986)

Secretary of Labor, MSHA v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Company, Docket No. LAKE 84-98. (Judge Kennedy, January 22, 1986)

There were no cases filed in which review was not granted.
COMMISSION DECISIONS
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
1730 K STREET NW, 6TH FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

February 13, 1986

SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA)

v.

Docket No. KENT 83-212

PYRO MINING COMPANY

BEFORE: Backley, Doyle, Lastowka and Nelson, Commissioners

ORDER

BY THE COMMISSION:

On January 30, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a per curiam decision in Pyro Mining Company v. FMSHRC, etc., No. 84-4022, affirming in part and reversing and remanding in part the decision of the Commission's administrative law judge in Pyro Mining Company, 6 FMSHRC 2488 (October 1984)(Docket No. KENT 83-212)(ALJ). (The judge's decision became a final decision of the Commission through operation of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(1).)

In accordance with the Court's remand order to the Commission, this matter is remanded to the administrative law judge originally assigned for further appropriate proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

Richard V. Backley, Commissioner

Joyce A. Doyle, Commissioner

James A. Lastowka, Commissioner

L. Clair Nelson, Commissioner
Distribution

Marcus P. McGraw, Esq.
Greenbaum, Doll & McDonald
1400 Vine Center Tower
P.O. Box 1808
Lexington, Kentucky 40593

Steve P. Robey, Esq.
The Trader Building
608 East Main St.
Providence, Kentucky 42450

Michael McCord, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
4015 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington, Virginia 22203

Carole M. Fernandez, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
280 U.S. Courthouse
801 Broadway
Nashville, TN 37203

Administrative Law Judge William Fauver
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission
5203 Leesburg Pike, 10th Floor
Falls Church, Virginia 22203
This civil penalty proceeding arises under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1982) (the "Mine Act"), and raises two issues: (1) whether Ozark-Mahoning Company ("Ozark-Mahoning") violated 30 C.F.R. § 57.15-4, a mandatory safety standard requiring the use of safety glasses or other suitable eye protective devices; 1/ and, if so, (2) whether the violation was "significant and substantial" within the meaning of section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). Following a hearing on the merits, a Commission administrative law judge found that Ozark-Mahoning violated the standard and that the violation was significant and substantial. The judge imposed a civil penalty of $350. 7 FMSHRC 1050 (July 1985) (ALJ). For the following reasons, we affirm the judge's decision.

1/ 30 C.F.R. § 57.15-4 states:

All persons shall wear safety glasses, goggles, or face shields or other suitable protective devices when in or around an area of a mine or plant where a hazard exists which could cause injury to unprotected eyes. (emphasis added).

Ozark-Mahoning operates the Denton Mine, an underground fluorspar mine located in Hardin County, Illinois. On May 24, 1984, Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration inspector, George LaLumondiere, observed miners, Dennis Darnell and Wendell Hicks, "collaring" drill holes with a jackleg percussion drill.  

Because the miners were drilling without eye protection and rock fragments were flying off the mining face, Inspector LaLumondiere issued a citation alleging a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 57.15-4. The inspector also found that the violation was significant and substantial. Immediately after receiving the citation, the mine superintendent obtained safety glasses for both miners and instructed them to wear the glasses while drilling.

The judge found that Ozark-Mahoning violated section 57.15-4 based upon undisputed testimony that the two miners were "collaring drill holes ... and drilling without wearing safety glasses or other eye protection" and that "rock fragments and chips fly out from the face while drilling and particularly while collaring holes." 7 FMSHRC at 1051. We conclude that substantial evidence of record supports the judge's finding. The miners admitted that they were not wearing safety glasses while drilling on the morning the inspector issued the citation. Also, Ozark-Mahoning did not dispute the testimony of the inspector that the process of collaring drill holes causes rock chips and fragments to fly out from the face posing a danger to the drillers' eyes and that many such eye injuries have been reported. In fact, Darnell, testified that "It is not that uncommon to get a piece in your eye every now and then when you're drilling."  Tr. 48. Darnell added, "If it's anything you can't get out, we go to the lunchroom ... and we've got a bottle of solution there that we wash our eyes out and go back to work."  Tr. 58. The testimony of the inspector and Darnell establishes that a violation of section 57.15-4 occurred.

In addition to challenging the judge's finding of a violation on substantial evidence grounds, Ozark-Mahoning contends that the cited standard is unenforceably vague. Ozark-Mahoning argues that because the standard does not specifically require the use of eye protection when drilling, it is not clear to the operator whether the standard is applicable when drill holes are collared. We find no merit in this argument. Section 57.15-4 is the type of safety standard that is drafted in general terms in order to be broadly adaptable to the myriad circumstances in a mine.  Kerr-McGee Corp., 3 FMSHRC 2496, 2497 (November 1981). Such a standard is not unenforceably vague when a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the mining industry and protective purpose of the standard would recognize the hazardous condition which the standard seeks to prevent.  U.S. Steel Corp., 6 FMSHRC 1908, 1910 (August 1984); U.S Steel Corp., 5 FMSHRC 3, 5 (January 1983); Alabama By-Products Corp., 4 FMSHRC 2128, 2129 (December 1982). Therefore, the pertinent inquiry here is whether

2/ "Collaring a hole" is explained as: "The formation of the front end of a drill hole, or the collar, which is the preliminary step in drilling to cause the drill bit to engage in the rock."  Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, A Dictionary of Mining, Mineral, and Related Terms 234 (1968).
a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the mining industry, would have recognized the existence of the hazard to the drillers' eyes while collaring drill holes.

Given the record evidence of the presence of a hazard to the drillers' eyes attested to by the inspector and Ozark-Mahoning's driller, we hold that a reasonably prudent person familiar with the industry would recognize the hazard. Therefore, the standard is applicable to the cited condition and the vagueness challenge is rejected.

Ozark-Mahoning also contests the judge's "significant and substantial" finding. It contends that the Secretary failed to prove that there was a reasonable likelihood that if an injury occurred it would be reasonably serious. We disagree.

A "significant and substantial" violation is described in section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act as a violation "of such nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal or other mine safety or health hazard." 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). A violation is properly designated significant and substantial "if, based upon the particular facts surrounding the violation there exists a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an injury or illness of a reasonably serious nature." Cement Division, National Gypsum Co., 3 FMSHRC 822, 825 (April 1981).

In this case, the inspector testified that he had suffered a "bad cut" on his right eye while collaring a drill hole without safety glasses and that numerous eye injuries of this type are reported. Moreover, it is obvious that whenever foreign objects are propelled into the eye there is a reasonable likelihood of loss or impairment of vision as well as injury. The fact that the driller has so far avoided serious injury is fortunate, but not determinative. Therefore, we conclude that the judge's significant and substantial finding must be affirmed.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the decision of the administrative law judge is affirmed.

Ford B. Ford, Chairman

Richard V. Backley, Commissioner

Joyce A. Doyle, Commissioner

James A. Lastowka, Commissioner

L. Clair Nelson, Commissioner
Distribution

W.G. Stacy
Vic Evans
Ozark-Mahoning Company
P.O. Box 57
Rosiclare, Illinois 62982

Ann Rosenthal, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
4015 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington, Virginia 22203

Administrative Law Judge Gary Melick
Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission
5203 Leesburg Pike, 10th Floor
Falls Church, Virginia 22041
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING : Docket No. D 86-1

BEFORE: Ford, Chairman; Lastowka and Nelson, Commissioners

ORDER

BY THE COMMISSION:

In this disciplinary matter pending before Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul Merlin, the attorney whose conduct is the subject of the proceeding has filed with the Commission a Motion to Quash the judge's setting of the hearing site in Washington, D.C. 1/ Originally, the judge noticed the hearing for February 27, 1986, in Washington. Following an objection from the attorney as to the timing and location of the hearing, the judge, by order dated February 5, 1986, rescheduled the hearing date for March 7, 1986, to accommodate the attorney, but retained the Washington hearing site. In the present motion, the attorney asserts that the Commission "has no authority or jurisdiction to subpoena individuals to testify at Commission hearings when said individual lives 450 miles from the hearing [s]ite." This jurisdictional argument is meritless and must be rejected. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d) & (e). We note also that the attorney is a party in this matter -- indeed, is the subject of the proceeding -- not merely a witness.

1/ This case arose from a disciplinary referral made by Commission Administrative Law Judge George A. Koutras in White Oak Coal Co., 7 FMSHRC 2039, 2047-52 (December 1985). On January 8, 1986, we referred the matter to Judge Merlin for appropriate proceedings under Commission Procedural Rule 80(c), 29 C.F.R. § 2700.80(c). Judge Merlin assigned the matter to himself.
We observe further, however, that Commission Procedural Rule 51 governs the setting of appropriate hearing sites and requires a careful balancing of interests. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.51. See Cut Slate, Inc., 1 FMSHRC 796, 796-98 (July 1979). The judge hereby is requested to reexamine his choice of hearing site specifically in view of the principles set forth in Cut Slate.

Accordingly, this matter is returned to the judge for proceedings consistent with this order. 2/

Ford B. Ford, Chairman

James A. Lastowka, Commissioner

E. Clair Nelson, Commissioner

2/ For purposes of ruling on this motion, we have designated ourselves as a panel of three members under section 113(c) of the Mine Act. 30 U.S.C. § 823(c).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISIONS
JOHN ED COX, Complainant
v. Docket No. SE 85-127-D
TENNESSEE CONSOLIDATED COAL, Respondent

DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDING


Before: Judge Melick

On May 22, 1985, the Complainant, John Ed Cox, filed a complaint of discrimination under section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq., "the Mine Safety Act," with the Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) against Tennessee Consolidated Coal. That complaint was denied by MSHA and Mr. Cox thereafter filed a complaint of discrimination with this Commission on his own behalf under section 105(c)(3) of the Mine Safety Act. Mr. Cox alleges that he suffered discrimination because he was "bumped to the second shift" by a less senior employee.

Tennessee Consolidated Coal in its Answer responded inter alia, that the complaint "fails to state a claim against Respondent upon which relief can be granted". That response may be taken as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the purposes of such a motion, the well pleaded material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted. 2A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.08. A complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that the complainant is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of a claim. Pleadings are, moreover, to be liberally construed and mere vagueness or lack of detail is not grounds for a motion to dismiss. Id.

Section 105(c)(1) of the Mine Safety Act provides as follows:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against or cause to be discharged or cause discrimination against or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the statutory rights of any miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment in any coal or other mine subject to this Act because such miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment, has filed or made a complaint under or related to this Act, including a complaint notifying the operator or the operator's agent, or the representative of the miners at the coal or other mine of an alleged danger or safety or health violation in a coal or other mine or because such miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment is the subject of medical evaluations and potential transfer under a standard published pursuant to section 101 or because such representative of miners or applicant for employment has instituted or caused to be instituted any proceedings under or related to this Act or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or because of the exercise by such miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment on behalf of himself or others of any statutory right afforded by this Act.

In order to establish a violation of section 105(c)(1) the Complainant must prove that he exercised a right or activity protected by the Mine Safety Act and that his transfer to the second shift was motivated in any part by the exercise of that protected activity. See Secretary ex. rel. David Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Company, 2 FMSHRC 2786 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom, Consolidation Coal Company v. Secretary, 663 F.2d 1211 (3rd Cir., 1981). In this case Mr. Cox asserts that he was transferred to the second shift in violation of his seniority rights because of his age. At hearings held on the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Mr. Cox was given further opportunity to explain the nature of his complaint. He readily acknowledged at those hearings that it had nothing to do with safety but was based solely on his perceived denial of seniority rights. Under the circumstances it is clear that the grounds asserted are not within the ambit of protections afforded by the Mine Safety Act. Accordingly the allegations are not sufficient to create a claim under section 105(c) and this case must be dismissed.
ORDER

Discrimination Proceedings, Docket No. SE 85-127-D are hereby dismissed.

Gary Melick
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Mr. John Ed Cox, Sunlite Lane, Gruetli, TN 37339 (Certified Mail)

William I. Althen, Smith, Heenan & Althen, 1110 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 (Certified Mail)

Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, P.O. Box 878, Jasper, TN 37347 (Certified Mail)

rbg
DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDING

Docket No. SE 86-15-DM

Hanleyville Quarry & Mill

MECHANICAL SYSTEMS SERVICES
INCORPORATED

Respondent

DECISION APPROVING SETTLEMENT

Before: Judge Merlin

The Solicitor has filed a motion to approve settlement of the above captioned discrimination proceeding in the amount of $400.00.

The operator was cited for a violation of § 105(c)(l) of the Act when it discharged the Complainant for refusing to engage in a practice she thought unsafe. As part of the settlement agreement, the operator has provided the Complainant full back pay which was the relief sought. The Solicitor also advises that no prior discrimination claims and only one prior assessment have been filed against the operator in the past two years. I accept the Solicitor's representations. In view of them the proposed settlement is Approved.

Accordingly, the operator is ORDERED TO PAY $400.00 within 30 days of the date of this decision.

Paul Merlin
Chief Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

William H. Berger, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30367 (Certified Mail)
Mr. Frank Walker, General Manager, Mechanical Systems Services, Inc., 745 Greenwood Road, West Columbia, SC 29169 (Certified Mail)

Ms. Carey D. Rauch, Route 2, Box 213-A1, Bythewood, SC 29016 (Certified Mail)

slk
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINER SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),
Petitioner

v.

YOUNGIOGHENY AND OHIO COAL
COMPANY,
Respondent

DECISION

Appearances: Patrick M. Zohn, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Cleveland, Ohio, for Petitioner; Robert C. Kota, Esq., St. Clairsville, Ohio, for Respondent.

Before: Judge Broderick

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner seeks a civil penalty for one alleged violation of a mandatory safety standard, that contained in 30 C.F.R. § 75.400. Respondent concedes that a violation occurred. It contests the classification of the violation as significant and substantial, and contends that the civil penalty proposed is inappropriately high. Pursuant to notice, the case was heard in Wheeling, West Virginia, on November 14, 1985. Carl Minear testified on behalf of Petitioner; Donald Statler testified on behalf of Respondent. The parties waived the filing of post hearing briefs, but each argued its position on the record after the evidence was introduced. I have considered the entire record and the contentions of the parties, and make the following decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent was the operator of an underground coal mine in Harrison County, Ohio, known as the Nelms No. 2 Mine.

2. Respondent is of moderate size. It produces approximately 550,000 tons of coal annually.
3. In the 24 months prior to the violation involved in this proceeding, Respondent had 79 paid violations of 30 C.F.R. § 75.400, the standard involved in this proceeding.

4. The imposition of a penalty in this proceeding will not affect Respondent's ability to continue in business.

5. The area covered by the order charging the violation involved herein was regularly examined by a union fireboss. Reports of such examinations on September 22, October 1, October 4, October 8, October 11, and October 15, 1984 did not refer to any accumulations of loose coal and coal dust. A report of an examination on October 18, 1984 states that "entries between 3 South seals and shaft and Main West seals and 3 South because of the top and ribs peeling they look like they were never rockdusted but were substantially dusted at one time. My opinion it would be a waste of labor and material since a real hazard does not exist." The report of examination on October 19, 1984 states: "Part of entry to the top and ribs peeled and covered all rockdust. I believe no hazard exists here. And I'm assuming this is the belief of all other inspectors, escorts, firebosses and safety personnel who have travelled this entry, since no citation was issued, and no mention was ever made of it needing rockdusted." The report of examination on October 22, 1984 does not refer to accumulations or need for rockdust.

6. MSHA inspectors inspected the area in question on 20 occasions between June 1978 and September, 1984. No citations or orders were issued charging an accumulation of loose coal, coal dust or other combustible materials.

7. On October 24, 1984, Federal Mine Inspector Carl Minear found loose coal and coal dust, 6 to 36 inches deep and 16 feet wide on the mine floor in entries 9, 10, 11 and 12 and the connecting crosscuts for a distance of 2200 feet, and the 4 Main West return entries between the return air shaft and 3 South seals, a distance of about 3000 feet. These accumulations resulted from coal sloughage and were black in color, indicating that rock dust had not been applied. Float coal dust was not present. The inspector issued a 104(d)(1) order of withdrawal charging a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.400.

8. The subject mine liberates in excess of one million cubic feet of methane in a 24 hour period. The area involved in the order including the seals (which seal off abandoned portions of the mine) is particularly apt to liberate methane. However, there was a double set of seals here, giving added protection against methane. At the time the order was issued
methane readings varied from 1.1 percent to 1.5 percent. No methane readings in the 5 to 15 percent range have ever been detected in the area in question.

9. The Inspector testified that the area in question looked as though it had never been rockdusted or that it had not been rockdusted in many years. In fact, company records indicate that it was rockdusted a total of eight times in 1981, 1982 and 1983. The coal sloughage was such that it covered the rock dust completely. At some time prior to the order, walkways had been made through the areas in question by shovelling the sloughage over against the ribs.

10. The area in question was approximately 5000 feet from the active sections in the mine. It was approximately 200 feet from the track entry.

11. Normally no miners travel the area except the fireboss. No machinery or equipment enters the area with the exception of the tools (including possibly a flame safety lamp) carried by the fireboss.

12. The order was terminated by rockdusting the area involved.

ISSUES

1. Whether the violation was properly designated significant and substantial?

2. What is the appropriate penalty for the violation?

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondent was subject to the provisions of the Mine Act in the operation of its Nelms No. 2 Mine, and I have jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding.

2. The violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.400 charged in the order of withdrawal issued October 24, 1984 did in fact occur.

3. The violation found was properly designated significant and substantial. The hazard involved here is a mine fire, which could result from an ignition caused by a nonpermissible flame safety lamp in the presence of methane. The violation contributed to the hazard because of (1) the substantial amount of combustible materials and the large area involved, and (2) the gassy nature of the mine and especially the seals area. Should an ignition occur, a fire would be
likely because of the accumulations, and there is a reasonable likelihood that it would result in serious injury to miners. See Mathies Coal Co., 6 FMSHRC 1 (1984).

4. The violation was serious for the reasons set out above.

5. Petitioner contends that the violation resulted from Respondent's negligence since it knew that the accumulations had existed for a long period of time. However, I conclude that its negligence was greatly diminished because MSHA inspectors had travelled the area and observed the accumulations for many years without issuing citations. I conclude the Respondent's negligence was minimal.

6. Respondent has a substantial history of previous violations of the standard in question. This is particularly significant in a gassy mine.

7. Based on the criteria in section 110(i) of the Act, I conclude that an appropriate penalty for the violation found is $500.

ORDER

Based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, Respondent is ORDERED to pay within 30 days of the date of this decision, the sum of $500 as a civil penalty for the violation found herein.

James A. Broderick
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Patrick M. Zohn, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, 881 Federal Office Building, 1240 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, OH 44199 (Certified Mail)

Robert C. Kota, Esq., Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Company, P.O. Box 1000, St. Clairsville, OH 43950 (Certified Mail)

slk

205
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),
ON BEHALF OF
JAMES CORBIN, ROBERT CORBIN,
AND A. C. TAYLOR,
Complainants,

v.

SUGARTREE CORPORATION,
TERCO, INCORPORATED, AND
RANDAL LAWSON,
Respondents

DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDING
Docket No. KENT 84-255-D
MSHA Case No. BARB 84-35
Sugartree No. 1 Mine

DECISION

Appearances: Carole M. Fernandez, Esq., Office of the
Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Nashville,
Tennessee, for Complainants;
Guy E. Millward, Jr., Esq., and D. Randall
Jewell, Esq., Barbourville, Kentucky, for
Sugartree Corporation and Randal Lawson, and
Carlos R. Morris, Esq., Barbourville, Kentucky,
for Terco Incorporated.

Before: Judge Melick

By decision dated December 10, 1985, the Respondents
herein were found jointly and severally liable for costs and
damages resulting from the unlawful discharge of the named
Complainants under section 105(c)(1) of the Federal Mine
(Appendix A). Hearings were thereafter held to ascertain
costs and damages and a decision concerning these matters was
issued January 10, 1986 (Appendix B). Interest calculations
were subsequently filed by the Secretary on January 24, 1986.

ORDER

Discrimination Proceedings

Sugartree Corporation, Terco, Incorporated and Randal
Lawson are hereby directed and ordered, jointly and severally,
to pay within 30 days of the date of this decision the following amounts to the designated persons:

James Corbin - $34,173.45
Robert Corbin - $36,355.90
A.C. Taylor - $35,811.74

The orders of reinstatement applicable to James Corbin and Robert Corbin by the interlocutory decisions in this matter dated December 10, 1985, and January 10, 1986, are now final.

Civil Penalty Proceedings

Sugartree Corporation, Terco, Incorporated and Randal Lawson are hereby directed and ordered, jointly and severally, to pay within 30 days of the date of this decision, a civil penalty of $1,000.

Gary Melick
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:


Guy E. Millward, Jr., Esq., and D. Randall Jewell, Esq., P.O. Box 645, Barbourville, KY 40906 (Certified Mail)

Carlos R. Morris, Esq., P.O. Box 1008, Barbourville, KY 40906 (Certified Mail)

rbg
This case is before me upon the Complaint by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of James Corbin, Robert Corbin, and A. C. Taylor under section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., the "Act," alleging that these miners were discharged from the Sugartree Corporation (Sugartree) on July 6, 1984, in violation of section 105(c)(1) of the Act.1

1Section 105(c)(1) of the Act provides in part as follows: "No person shall discharge . . . or cause to be discharged or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the statutory rights of any miner . . . in any . . . mine subject to this Act because such miner . . . has filed or made a complaint under or related to this Act, including a complaint notifying the operator or operators agent . . . of an alleged danger or health violation in a . . . mine . . . or because of the exercise by such miner . . . on behalf of himself or others of any statutory right afforded by this Act."
On April 30, 1985, the Secretary sought to amend his Complaint by alleging that Randal Lawson was also a "person" responsible for the claimed unlawful discharge of the three miners and that Terco Incorporated (Terco), Sadd Coal Company, Inc., and Hubbs Creek Corporation were "alter egos" and/or successor corporations to Sugartree and as such were jointly and severally liable for damages suffered by the individual complainants. The Secretary also asserts in his amended complaint that the named business organizations, as successors or "alter-egos" to Sugartree, must reinstate the individual complainants to positions equivalent to the positions they formerly held with Sugartree since Sugartree was no longer in business. Joinder was initially permitted for purposes of consolidated proceedings on the merits and to receive evidence on the Motion to Amend. For the reasons set forth in this decision the Secretary's Motion to Amend is granted so as to allow retroactive joinder of Terco and Randal Lawson as party respondents in this proceeding but is denied as to Sadd Coal Company, Inc. and Hubbs Creek Corporation. Rule 19, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. applicable by virtue of Commission Rule 1(b), 29 C.F.R. § 2700.1(b).

In order for the Secretary to establish a prima facie violation of section 105(c)(1) of the Act, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual complainants engaged in an activity protected by that section and that their discharge or removal from Sugartree was motivated in any part by the protected activity. Secretary ex rel. David Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Company, 2 FMSHRC 2786, (1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Consolidation Coal Company v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211, (3d Cir. 1981). See also Boitch v. FMSHRC, 719 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1983), and NLRB v. Transportation Management Corporation, 462 U.S. 393 (1983), affirming burden of proof allocations similar those in the Pasula Case.

The undisputed evidence shows that on the Friday before the 1984 4th-of-July vacation at the Sugartree No. 1 underground mine, James Corbin, the day shift continuous miner operator, reported a problem with the water sprays on the continuous miner to Joe Watkins, the general mine foreman. Upon returning to work on July 5, Corbin found that the water sprays had still not been repaired and, as a result, dust created by the operation of the continuous miner was "hitting the face" and enveloping Corbin and other miners working in the entry. Corbin explained that the miner was of necessity also cutting 2 to 4 inches of rock in the process thereby mixing large quantities rock dust with the coal dust. In addition, the ventilation was insufficient to remove the dust from the work area. The dust was particularly severe to the
right of the continuous miner where A. C. Taylor and James' bother, Robert Corbin, were working.

Corbin and the others complained about the dust to face boss James Proffit. It is not disputed that the dust was so thick and the visibility so limited that the miners were unable to properly test roof conditions as they progressed and were unable to see the continuous miner as it moved in close proximity to the men. In particular James Corbin was unable to see the other miners working near the continuous miner he was operating thereby making it difficult to avoid hitting them.

Proffit reported these initial complaints by the mine telephone to the outside to Mine Foreman Watkins. Watkins reportedly told the men to correct the problem by clamping off the spray bar. The bar was then clamped but the sprays even then did not work. Corbin testified that he was able to make about nine cuts with the continuous miner before the dust got so bad that he got sick and started "throwing-up." His eyes were extremely irritated and he could see nothing. Corbin again complained to Proffit who again telephoned the complaint to Watkins. Watkins then told Proffit to tell the men to "cut coal or go home". The entire work crew of 7 decided to go home than rather than work under these conditions.

Robert Corbin was working as a jack setter adjacent to the rib on the right side of the continuous miner and only 4 feet from the face. He too complained because of the dust conditions. According to him it was so bad you could not see your out-stretched hand. Even though he wore a painters dust mask his lungs were "burning" from the dust. A. C. Taylor was also working on the right side of the continuous miner that day but as a timberman. According to Taylor the dust was so thick that it filled his eyes, lungs, and nose. He could "neither breathe nor see."

Jerry Bray, then a floating foreman for Sugartree, acknowledged that the conditions were extremely dusty and were therefore hazardous. In particular he found that the right side of the entry was not ventilating properly. Everybody working in the entry was complaining about the dust but the three miners working on the right side were exposed to more dust and were complaining more.

The sprays on the continuous miner were thereafter fixed and the three complainants worked the next day. At the end of the day however, Mine Foreman Joe Watkins issued each a lay-off slip indicating thereon that the men were being "laid-off because of a sharp decline in production".
According to James Corbin, however, Terry McCrea, then vice president of Sugartree, said they were discharged because they had not run coal the day before. James Proffit the face boss told James Corbin that management wanted to know who was doing the "crying" in the mine and Proffit reportedly told Watkins that it was the "right side" meaning Taylor and the Corbin brothers. James Corbin explained that the right side of the continuous miner was the most seriously affected by the dust because the dust was drawn that way by the ventilation. Robert Corbin also asked Joe Watkins why they were laid-off and Watkins reportedly said that it was because they "wouldn't work in the dust". McCrea also reportedly said they were laid-off because they would not work in the dust.

Mine Foreman Joe Watkins recalled getting calls from the face boss, James Proffit, on the day in question concerning the broken spray bar and the reluctance of the three complainants to work in the dust. He told Proffit to send the men home. Watkins claims that when he handed out the lay-off slips the next day he told the Corbins that he could not tell them why they were laid-off, and that they should see "Cotton" (the nickname for Sugartree president Randal Lawson) for an explanation. Watkins admits however that he told Lawson that it was the men on the right side and specifically James Corbin, Robert Corbin and A. C. Taylor, who were complaining about the dust and refusing to work in it. It was only a short time later that Lawson came back with the lay-off slips for these same three miners. Watkins admits that he and Lawson then also discussed hiring three new men to replace the Complainants. Lawson told Watkins that he would replace them by the next Monday. Indeed a new miner operator and jack setter were immediately hired and several days later another jack setter was hired.

Randal Lawson, president and sole owner of Sugartree at the time of the "lay-offs" admittedly discussed the "lay-offs" with both Joe Watkins, the mine foreman and Mathew Logan, superintendent of operations. Lawson admitted that before he "laid-off" the complainants Watkins told him that those were the three who had been complaining about the excessive dust and that indeed his decision to "lay-off" the complainants was made "because they were the ones that complained". He also admits that he then told Watkins that he would obtain replacements for the three.

Within this framework of evidence it is clear beyond all doubt that Randal Lawson "laid-off" the three complainants on July 6, 1984, based solely on their protected safety complaints and/or their protected refusal to work in the face
of clearly hazardous conditions. There is no dispute that the complainants refusal to work under the circumstances was based upon a good faith reasonable believe that the continuance of the work under the conditions presented would have been hazardous. See Robinette v. United Castle Coal Company, 3 FMSHRC 803 (1981). Accordingly both Randal Lawson as an individual and the Sugartree Corporation, for which Randal Lawson was agent, are "persons" who unlawfully discharged the complainants under section 105(c)(1) of the Act. See footnote 1, supra. For the above reasons Randal Lawson was also properly joined as a party respondent by the amended complaint filed by the Secretary. Rule 19, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.

Fashioning a remedy in this case through the award of damages and reinstatement has been complicated by what must be construed as evasive efforts by Mr. Lawson and his associates. Indeed it appears that on the same day that two of the complainants presented an order of temporary reinstatement issued by the Commission's Chief Judge to representatives of Sugartree, Sugartree ceased mining operations and many of the same principals, supervisors and employees continued mining operations in essentially the same mine under the same MSHA identity number but under the name of Terco. At the time of hearings Sugartree apparently had no assets and was not engaged in any mining activity. The Secretary accordingly has alleged in his Amended Complaint that an appropriate remedy of damages and particularly of reinstatement cannot be fully obtained without the joinder of Terco as a successor to Sugartree. Rule 19, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.

In resolving the question of successorship in Munsey v. Smitty Baker Coal Company, Inc., et al, 2 FMSHRC 3463 (1980), the Commission applied the factors used by the Federal Courts in EEOC v. McMillan Bloedel Containers Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1974). These factors are: (1) whether the successor company had notice of the charge, (2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief, (3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of business operations, (4)

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2 MSHA roof and ventilation specialist Roger Dingess also inspected the Sugartree mine on July 10, 1984, and found that the ventilation continued to be seriously inadequate and was in violation of the ventilation plan. He also found that the sprays on the continuous miner were not then working properly and that excessive dust was in suspension. In addition to the long term health hazard associated with miners breathing respirable dust Dingess observed the immediate hazards caused by lack of visibility and the effects of coughing and vomiting caused by inhaling and ingesting the rock dust.
whether the new employer uses the same plant, (5) whether he uses the same or substantially the same work force, (6) whether he uses the same or substantially the same supervisory personnel, (7) whether the same jobs exist under substantially the same work conditions, (8) whether he uses the same machinery, equipment and methods of production and (9) whether he produces the same product.

There is no dispute that when mining operations shifted from Sugartree to Terco in July 1984, Randal Lawson was president and Carol McCrea was secretary/treasurer of both Sugartree and Terco. Thus whatever notice these agents of Sugartree had they also had that notice as agents of Terco. Since the initial complaints were filed by the individual miners with MSHA on July 12, 1984, and an investigation was thereafter conducted by MSHA it may reasonably be inferred that Terco had notice that charges of unlawful discrimination had been made. Indeed since Mr. Lawson was the perpetrator of what he should have known was a violation of the Act he should not now be heard to complain that he, as president and agent of both Sugartree and Terco, did not have notice of the corresponding liability under the Act of both Sugartree and Terco. Under the circumstances I find that Terco in fact did have notice of the charges.

Since Sugartree admittedly has no assets and is apparently no longer engaged in any business activity it is clear that it could not provide relief either through monetary damages or reinstatement. I also find that a substantial continuity of business operations was maintained from Sugartree to Terco. Indeed the mine foreman for both Sugartree and Terco, Joe Watkins, testified that he only learned of the changeover when the former vice president of Sugartree and subsequent president of Terco, Terry McCrea, told him. Watkins testified that he saw no other noticeable change except the method of mining changed around that time to "shooting from solid". Watkins testified that six or seven or about one-half of the employees of Sugartree also continued working for Terco.

Watkins also observed that under Terco they continued to use the same mine entrance although they began closing off the left side of the mine and prepared to mine the right side. There was apparently only a brief delay necessitated by preparatory matters relating to ventilation before coal production continued. It is observed that the original ventilation plan submitted by Sugartree includes both the right side and the left side of what has been identified as the Sugartree No. 1 Mine. The evidence also shows that Terco began operating on the right side under the same mine identity that
had been filed with MSHA by Sugartree. Within this framework it is clear that Terco continued to mine coal from essentially the same mine as Sugartree using substantially the same workforce and supervisory personnel.

While the evidence shows that the method of mining followed by Terco, known as "shooting from the solid" differed from the method followed by Sugartree, i.e., continuous mining, this change was not significant. While Terco would not have needed a continuous miner operator under this method of mining it is clear that the same personnel could have been used in other capacities for which they had been trained. Within the above framework of evidence it is clear that Terco was a successor business entity and accordingly is jointly and severally liable for the illegal acts of discrimination in this case. Accordingly the Secretary's Motion to Amend by also including Terco, Incorporated as a party respondent is also granted. Rule 19, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. The Motion to Amend to join Sadd Coal Company, Inc. and Hubbs Creek Corporation is denied since the Secretary has not shown that with the joinder of Terco and Randal Lawson complete relief could not now be accorded to the complainants. Rule 19, supra.

ORDER

Terco Incorporated is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate James Corbin, Robert Corbin, and A. C. Taylor to the same (or comparable) positions they held at the time of their "lay-off" on July 6, 1984, at the Sugartree Corporation. It is further ordered that the Secretary of Labor immediately confer with the Sugartree Corporation, Terco, Incorporated, and Randal Lawson, through their representatives if applicable, to determine the amount of costs, damages, and interest due as a result of the unlawful discharges found in this case. The Secretary shall thereafter file with the undersigned a written report of such consultations on or before December 31, 1985. This decision is not a final disposition of this case and no final disposition will be made until such time as the issues of costs, damages and interest are resolved.

CIVIL PENALTY

In light of my findings herein that Randal Lawson discharged James Corbin, Robert Corbin, and A. C. Taylor in clear violation of section 105(c)(1) of the Act and that he knew or should have known that when he discharged those individuals he was doing so in violation of the Act, I find that a high degree of negligence was involved. The violation was quite serious in that the individual miners asserting
their rights under the Act unlawfully lost their source of work and income. The violation not only had an immediate economic and social impact upon the individual miners but also had the effect of deterring others from asserting their rights under the Act. The violation was accordingly quite serious. I consider that the responsible parties were of small size and had no history of prior violations of section 105(c). Wherefore Sugartree Corporation, Terco Incorporated and Randal Lawson will be, upon final disposition of these proceedings, jointly and severally ordered to pay civil penalties in the amount of $1,000.

Gary Melick
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:


Guy E. Millward, Jr., Esq., P.O. Box 645, Barbourville, KY 40906 (Certified Mail)

Carlos R. Morris, Esq., P.O. Box 1008, Barbourville, KY 40906 (Certified Mail)

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APPENDIX B

January 10, 1986

SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), ON BEHALF OF JAMES CORBIN, ROBERT CORBIN, AND A. C. TAYLOR, Complainants, v. SUGARTREE CORPORATION, TERCO, INCORPORATED, AND RANDAL LAWSON, Respondents

DECISION


Before: Judge Melick

By decision dated December 10, 1985, the Respondents herein were found jointly and severally liable for costs and damages resulting from the unlawful discharge of the named Complainants under section 105(c)(1) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq., the "Act". Hearings were thereafter held on the issue of costs and damages on January 2, 1986, in London, Kentucky.

A backpay damage award is the sum equal to the gross pay the miner would have earned but for the unlawful discharge, less his actual "net interim earnings." Bradley v. Belva Coal Company, 4 FMSHRC 982 (1982); Secretary ex. rel. Dunmire and Estle v. Northern Coal Company, 4 FMSHRC 126 (1982). "Net interim earnings" is an accepted term of art which does not refer to net earnings in the usual sense (gross pay minus various withholdings). Rather, the term describes the employees gross interim earnings less those expenses (if any) incurred in seeking and holding the interim
employment - expenses that the employee would not have incurred had he not suffered the unlawful discharge. Belva Coal Company, supra.

It is undisputed that at the time of their unlawful discharge from Sugartree Corporation (Sugartree), each of the individual Complainants regularly worked 9 hours a day, 5 days a week. They earned $9.50 per hour for the first 40 hours a week and $14.75 an hour for the additional 5 hours a week overtime. They also worked one Saturday a month in return for major medical insurance coverage under a Blue Cross and Blue Shield policy. According to former Sugartree president Randal Lawson this coverage cost $200 per month for each employee. This amount is to be included in the backpay award as a fringe benefit that was an integral part of the Complainants wage-benefit package at Sugartree. Northern Coal Co., supra.

The backpay computation based upon the stated earnings and fringe benefits should commence on July 6, 1984, the date the Complainants were unlawfully discharged and should terminate but not include the date of reinstatement or waiver of reinstatement i.e., January 6, 1986. At hearings on January 2, 1986, James and Robert Corbin accepted reinstatement to successor mine operator Terco, Incorporated commencing January 6, 1986. At the same proceedings A. C. Taylor waived his right to reinstatement because he had obtained preferable alternative employment.

Robert Corbin also suffered specific losses from his unlawful discharge because he was thereafter required to twice refinance a jeep automobile because of his inability to make the higher monthly payments. According to the Bank of Williamsburg Mr. Corbin will be required to pay $1,240.84 in additional finance charges because of this refinancing. That amount is properly chargeable as damages in these proceedings and interest should be charged on that amount in accordance with the costs noted in Exhibit D-G-6. See Secretary ex. rel. Noland v. Luck Quarries, Inc., 1 FMSHRC 2426 (1980).

Respondents have the burden of proving mitigation of damages including interim earnings. N.L.R.B. v. Izzi, 395 F.2d 241 (1st Cir., 1968); and N.L.R.B. v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 972 (1966). In this case the Secretary produced each of the individual Complainants as witnesses who testified concerning their interim earnings. While some of this testimony is vague and imprecise, Respondents have produced no contradictory evidence. Accordingly I accept the testimony of the individual Complainants as to their interim earnings as best as can be reconstructed. Where there is any uncertainty I have accepted the larger amount of interim earnings thereby reducing the liability of Respondents. There is also evidence in this case that the Complainants had received various

JAMES CORBIN

$1,000 should be deducted as interim earnings for amounts James Corbin received in 1984 from Dick Hall who was apparently superintendent of a now defunct coal mine operator. Although Corbin concedes that this amount was paid for work performed during 1984 he maintains that it was a "loan" from Dick Hall to cover a "cold check" issued by the mine operator. Since the "loan" apparently does not have to be repaid until the mine operator finally makes good on his check to Corbin and since there is no formal evidence of debt I consider this amount as interim earnings to be deducted from the backpay award.

During the first quarter of 1985, James Corbin earned $1,800 from the Girdner Mining Company. During the second quarter of 1985 he earned $500 at the A.A. Coal Company and $600 at the Fair Lady Coal Company. He earned $2,400 at the Big Fanny Coal Company during the third quarter of 1985, and during the fourth quarter of 1985 he received $560 for work performed for Junior Helton. As of the date of hearing he continued to work for Junior Helton and presumably continued to earn a maximum of $350 per week.

ROBERT CORBIN

It is not disputed that Robert Corbin had no interim earnings during 1984. The evidence shows that in the first quarter of 1985 he earned $1,449 from the Girdner Mining Company and that during the second quarter 1985 he earned $1,466 from the Fair Lady Coal Company. Thereafter, and presumably during the third quarter of 1985, Robert Corbin worked part time at the Ellison Funeral Home as a grave digger earning $1,500. During the fourth quarter of 1985 he earned $1,800 from the H & R Coal Company and as of the date of hearing continued to work for this company at $300 per week.

A. C. TAYLOR

According to check stubs in evidence, Mr. Taylor had net interim earnings from the Girdner Mining Company during the fourth quarter of 1984 of $792 (Exhibit D-G-5). These check stubs show that Mr. Taylor had net interim earnings from the Girdner Mining Company during the first quarter of 1985 of $288. Since he testified to earning $380.27 from the Girdner
Mining Company (Exhibit D-G-4) for that same period. I accept this larger amount as correct. Taylor also earned $627.47 from the G&S Mining Company during the first quarter of 1985. He had no earnings during the second and third quarters of 1985. During the fourth quarter of 1985 commencing October 21, 1985, he was earning $350 per week. He continued to earn that amount through the date of the hearing.

ORDER

Within the framework of the findings in this decision the Secretary is directed to compute the total amount of damages and interest through January 31, 1986, to be awarded the individual Complainants in this proceeding. Those computations shall be filed with the undersigned on or before January 25, 1986. The Secretary is also directed to file a status report on or before January 25, 1986, concerning the reinstatement of James and Robert Corbin. This decision is not a final disposition of these proceedings and such a disposition will not be made until the issues of costs, damages, interest, reinstatement and the amount of civil penalty are finally resolved.

Gary Melick
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:


Guy E. Millward, Jr., Esq., P.O. Box 645, Barbourville, KY 40906 (Certified Mail)

Carlos R. Morris, Esq., P.O. Box 1038, Barbourville, KY 40906 (Certified Mail)
These proceedings concern civil penalty proposals filed by the petitioner against the respondent pursuant to section 110(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 820(a), seeking civil penalty assessments for alleged violations of mandatory safety standard 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403 and 75.1403-8(d).

The respondent filed timely answers contesting the proposed civil penalties and hearings were held in Birmingham, Alabama. The parties waived the filing of posthearing proposed findings and conclusions. However, all oral arguments made by counsel on the record during the course of the hearings have been considered by me in the adjudication of these cases.
**Issue**

The principal issues presented in these proceedings are (1) whether the safeguard provisions found in 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403, and the criteria which follow in sections 75.1403-(b)(3) and 75.1403-8(d) are advisory or mandatory requirements, and (2) whether the respondent's failure to comply with the terms of the safeguard notices issued in these cases constitutes a violation of mandatory safety standards for which civil penalties may be assessed.

**Applicable Statutory and Regulatory Provisions**


3. Commission Rules, 29 C.F.R. § 2700.1 et seq.

**Stipulations**

The parties stipulated to the following:

1. The respondent is the owner and operator of the subject mine.

2. The respondent and the mine are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.

3. The Administrative Law Judge has jurisdiction in these cases.

4. The MSHA Inspectors who issued the subject orders or citations were authorized representatives of the Secretary.

5. A true and correct copy of the subject citations were properly served upon the respondent.

6. The copy of the subject citations and determination of violations at issue are authentic and may be admitted into evidence for purpose of establishing their issuance, but not for the purpose of establishing the truthfulness or relevance of any statements asserted therein.
7. Imposition of civil penalties in these cases will not affect the respondent's ability to do business.

8. The alleged violations were abated in good faith.

9. The respondent's history of prior violations is average.

10. The respondent is a medium-size operator.

Discussion

The violations in issue in these proceedings are as follows:

Docket No. SE 85-59

Section 104(a) "S&S" Citation No. 2310757, was issued at 10:00 a.m., on June 15, 1984, and it cites a violation of mandatory safety standard 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-8(d). The condition or practice is described as follows:

The clearance along the section 007-0 track was obstructed by 2 timbers laying along the track and a material car loaded with timbers that was hanging out over the straight track over which men and materials are transported. The timbers on the supply car was (sic) hanging out over the man bus that was operating on the straight track. L. A. Holified park (sic) the timber car in the kick back under the direct supervision and instruction of supervisor Earnest Warren. This violation is a part of 107 A Order No. 2310756 so no abatement time is set.

Docket No. SE 85-60

Section 104(a) "S&S" Citation No. 2483944, was issued at 8:35 a.m., on January 22, 1985, and it cites a violation of mandatory safety standard 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403. The condition or practice is described as follows: "The No. 7 man bus being used to transport seven miners from the No. 8 section was not equipped with an operative sanding device in that the reservoirs were empty and sand passed through the lines on the track when the bus was parked."
Luther McAnally testified that he is a retired former MSHA inspector, and he confirmed that he issued an imminent danger order and a citation in this case on June 15, 1984. He stated that a material car loaded with timbers was parked in a "kick back" along the track in question. The loaded timbers were protruding over the track and two timbers were lying on the ground and touching the ties over which the track was laid.

Mr. McAnally stated that he was in a track jeep with the company safety inspector, a mine safety committeeeman, and the jeep operator, and as the jeep travelled along the track it passed close to the protruding timbers, and in fact "bumped" the timbers as the jeep came to a stop. Mr. McAnally stated that he had to scramble and move over in his seat to avoid being struck by the timbers, but that the jeep operator who was seated at the controls in an enclosed cab had no room to move in the event the jeep continued and struck the timbers. The operator's cab was approximately 6 to 7 inches off the rail, and Mr. McAnally believed that the operator would have suffered serious injuries had he been struck by the timbers. With respect to the two timbers lying by the track, Mr. McAnally believed they presented a hazard since they obstructed the rail and were not clear of the jeep travelway.

Mr. McAnally stated that he issued an imminent danger order to isolate the cited hazardous kick back area where the timbers were located and to remove the occupants of the jeep from further exposure to the obstruction hazard. He confirmed that he issued the section 104(a) citation at the same time in order to cite a violation of section 75.1403(8)(d), and to achieve abatement of the condition. He confirmed that he relied on a previously issued safeguard notice, No. T.J.I. issued by MSHA Inspector T. J. Ingram on July 27, 1976, to support his citation (exhibit G-1) (Tr. 18-24).

On cross-examination, Mr. McAnally confirmed that he and the other individuals in the man trip jeep were the only individuals exposed to the hazard resulting from the cited conditions. He stated that his principal duties as an inspector entailed the inspection of mines and the enforcement of mandatory safety standards. He denied that his duties included the rendering of advice to mine operators or miners.
Mr. McAnally stated that at the time of his inspection he was aware of the fact that Mr. Ingram had issued the previous safeguard notice, and he confirmed this by reviewing the official files in his office (Tr. 27-33).

Petitioner's counsel confirmed that the 1976 safeguard notice relied on by Inspector McAnally makes reference to several locations along the track haulageway where the clearance was less than 24 inches. The notice also makes reference to an obstructed clearance in a walkway in that refuse, loose rock, and supplies were present. He also confirmed that the conditions cited by Mr. McAnally must be substantially the same kind of conditions described in the original safeguard notice. His position is that since Mr. McAnally found there was no track clearance, or less than 24 inches of clearance because of the protruding timbers, his reliance on the prior notice was proper (Tr. 35-36). Inspector McAnally confirmed that there are no other specific mandatory standards covering the conditions he cited, and if there were, he would have cited another appropriate standard rather than relying on the safeguard notice (Tr. 36).

MSHA Inspector T. J. Ingram confirmed that he issued a safeguard notice at the No. 3 Mine on July 27, 1976, exhibit G-1, and stated that he did so after finding the main track haulageway cluttered along a tight curve going north along a track haulageway. The required track clearance was less than the required 24 inches. Mr. Ingram confirmed that he served the notice on Ken Price, the respondent's safety inspector, and that he discussed with him the cited conditions as well as what was required to abate the conditions (Tr. 40).

On cross-examination, Mr. Ingram confirmed that he has rendered advice to miners and management personnel in the mines with respect to safety practices. He also confirmed that he has pointed out violative conditions during his inspections, and that his advice and recommendations, while not mandatory, are freely given as part of his inspection duties (Tr. 40-43).

In response to further questions, Mr. Ingram stated that once a safeguard notice is issued, an inspector may rely on it in future inspections where he issues citations or orders. He confirmed that the notice he issued on July 27, 1976, is still in effect at the No. 3 Mine, and that in the event he finds an obstructed clearance on the track haulageway, he would issue a citation and rely on that notice. He confirmed that there is no way that a mine operator can be relieved of the requirements of a safeguard notice, and he believed that
the conditions cited in such a notice must be the same or similar to any condition which he might find on any given day (Tr. 45).

During the course of the hearing, I took note of the fact that subsequent to the time Mr. McAnally issued his citation of June 15, 1984, another MSHA inspector (Theron E. Walker) modified the citation on October 3, 1984, (copy in pleadings), to delete the "initial action" shown on item 14 of the citation form. Item 14 is the place on the form where Inspector McAnally made reference to Mr. Ingram's safeguard notice of July 27, 1975.

Mr. McAnally had no knowledge of the modification issued by Inspector Walker (Tr. 46). When asked to explain this modification, MSHA Counsel Palmer stated that Mr. Walker probably intended to modify the section 107(a) order issued by Inspector McAnally at the time he issued his separate section 104(a) citation, but did not distinguish the two (Tr. 47). Counsel asserted that notwithstanding the deletion by Inspector Walker, the respondent had adequate notice of the requirements of the safeguard notice relied on by Inspector McAnally, and that the citation issued by Mr. McAnally specifically made reference to that safeguard notice. Counsel concluded that the deletion is immaterial to the issue presented in this case, and he maintained that the respondent had adequate notice as to what was required by the safeguard notice at the time it was issued by Mr. McAnally and up to and including the time of abatement (Tr. 48).

Respondent's counsel could offer no explanation for the deletion, and his position is that Mr. McAnally's citation must stand or fall on the question of whether the safeguard provided adequate notice to the respondent as to what was required to achieve compliance (Tr. 49). Counsel's position is that the safeguard notice is inadequate to change it into a mandatory standard requirement (Tr. 49).

Petitioner's Testimony and Evidence - Docket No. SE 85-60

Petitioner's counsel stated that the inspector who issued Citation No. 2483944, Steve J. Kirkland, was out of the State on other MSHA business and was not available to testify in this proceeding. However, the parties stipulated that the facts alleged in Citation No. 2483944 occurred as alleged. They also stipulated that the civil penalty factors as set forth in section III of the citation (negligence, gravity, and good faith), and on the second page of the proposed assessment (MSHA Form 1000-179), are properly evaluated.
MSHA Inspector Thomas Meredith confirmed that he issued safeguard Notice No. 1 T.L.M. on October 19, 1976, at the respondent's No. 3 Mine and that he served it on the respondent's mine safety inspector Ken Price. Mr. Meredith stated that he discussed the notice with Mr. Price, explained the conditions referred to therein, and advised him what had to be done to insure future compliance with the notice (exhibit G-1).

Mr. Meredith stated that the previous 1976 MESA safeguard notice form did not provide for a reference to the particular safeguard section, such as section 75.1403-6(b)(3), and that he simply referred to section 75.1403, Subpart O, and described the specific safeguard as "adequate and operative sanding devices."

On cross-examination, Mr. Meredith confirmed that in his capacity as an MSHA inspector he often gives advice to miners concerning mine safety conditions or practices. He also confirmed that he gave the respondent a reasonable amount of time to abate the conditions described in his safeguard notice and that he issued several extensions to afford the respondent an opportunity to correct the conditions (Tr. 75-77).

Petitioner's exhibit G-2, consists of copies of previously issued section 104(a) citations issued at the No. 3 Mine (Tr. 79), and they are as follows:

Citation No. 0748974, September 26, 1979, 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403. The No. 7 personnel carrier being used on material and mantrip haulage system was not provided with operating sanding device. Safeguard No. 1 T.L.M. dated 10-19-76.

Citation No. 0748973, September 26, 1979, 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-6(b)(3). The No. 13 personnel carrier being used on material and mantrip haulage system was not provided with operating sanding device. Safeguard No. 1 T.L.M. dated 10-19-76.

Citation No. 0748972, September 26, 1979, 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-6(b)(3). The No. 11 personnel carrier being used on material and mantrip haulage system was not provided with operating sanding device. Safeguard No. 1 T.L.M. dated 10-19-76.
The citations were subsequently abated after the respondent provided the cited personnel carriers with operating sanding devices.

**Respondent's Arguments**

The respondent's arguments with respect to the previously issued safeguard notices in these cases are as follows (Tr. 49-68):

1. The safeguard notice provisions found in section 75.1403, and the criteria which follow with respect to self-propelled personnel carriers section 75.1403-6(b)(3), concerning properly installed and well-maintained sanding devices, and section 75.1403-8(d), concerning haulage road clearances are advisory rather than mandatory requirements.

2. The previously issued safeguard notices relied on by the inspectors in these proceedings are general and advisory in nature and fail to specifically put the respondent on notice as to what is required to insure compliance with any applicable mandatory safety standards.

3. The previously issued safeguard notices, on their face, particularly with respect to the printed language on the form (Specific Recommended Safeguards) supports a conclusion that those notices are advisory recommendations rather than mandatory enforceable standards.

4. On the facts presented in these proceedings, the previously issued advisory safeguard notices do not specifically refer to conditions or practices cited by the inspectors in the citations issued in these proceedings.

5. The use of the "advisory" word rather than the "mandatory" word shall in the prior safeguard notices connote an advisory rather than a mandatory requirement for compliance.
With regard to the previously issued 1979 citations, exhibit G-2, where the inspectors relied on Inspector Meredith's safeguard notice of October 19, 1976, to support violations for the respondent's failure to provide operating sanding devices on its personnel carriers, respondent's counsel asserted that simply because these citations were issued, MSHA may not "bootstrap" the safeguard notice and transform it into a mandatory standard (Tr. 57). When asked whether or not these prior citations were contested, respondent's counsel replied that he was not in the respondent's employ at that time, and that mine management would rather pay the civil penalties rather than "make an inspector mad" (Tr. 58). He also asserted that citations are sometimes paid out of ignorance or "they get caught up in the paperwork" (Tr. 66).

Respondent's counsel conceded that an adequately written safeguard notice may become a mandatory standard on a mine-by-mine, case-by-case basis (Tr. 58). Counsel does not dispute the facts as stated on the face of the citations issued in these proceedings. His argument is that the safeguard notices used by the inspectors to support the citations are inadequate and do not put the No. 3 Mine on notice as to what is required to maintain compliance. Counsel is of the view that the safeguards are advisory opinions rather than mandatory standard requirements (Tr. 59). In support of these arguments, counsel cited the case of Secretary of Labor v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company and OSHRC, 584 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1978), to support his argument that the use of the word "should" in regulatory safety and health rules are viewed only as recommendations and not as mandatory standards (Tr. 50, 59).

Counsel argues that since MSHA inspectors provide advice and recommendations to mine operators in the course of their inspections, the use of the word "should" in the safeguard notices fails to adequately put the operator on notice as to what is actually required of him in terms of compliance. In short, counsel argues that the inspectors failed to adequately differentiate what is mandatory and what is advisory (Tr. 51). Counsel conceded that had the inspectors who issued the safeguard notices used the word "shall" rather than "should," and made it clear that it was a mandatory requirement, he would concede that adequate mandatory notice has been given to the respondent (Tr. 59-60).

In further support of his arguments, respondent's counsel requested that I take judicial notice of my decisions in Monterey Coal Company v. MSHA, LAKE 83-67, LAKE 83-78, and

Findings and Conclusions

30 C.F.R. § 75.1403 repeats section 314(b) of the Act and provides as follows: "Other safeguards adequate, in the judgment of an authorized representative of the Secretary, to minimize hazards with respect to transportation of men and materials shall be provided."

Section 75.1403-1 provides:

(a) Sections 75.1403-2 through 75.1403-11 set out the criteria by which an authorized representative of the Secretary will be guided in requiring other safeguards on a mine-by-mine basis under section 75.1403. Other safeguards may be required.

(b) The authorized representative of the Secretary shall in writing advise the operator of a specific safeguard which is required pursuant to section 75.1403 and shall fix a time in which the operator shall provide and thereafter maintain such safeguard. If the safeguard is not provided within the time fixed and if it is not maintained thereafter, a notice shall be issued to the operator pursuant to section 104 of the Act.

(c) Nothing in the sections in the section 75.1403 series in this Subpart O precludes the issuance of a withdrawal order because of imminent danger.

In Southern Ohio Coal Company, (SOCCO), 7 FMSHRC 509 (April 1985), the Commission noted that the safeguard provisions of the Act confer upon the Secretary "unique authority" to promulgate the equivalent of mandatory safety standards without resort to the otherwise formal rulemaking requirements of the Act. The Commission held that safeguards,
unlike ordinary standards, must be strictly construed, and a safeguard notice "must identify with specificity the nature of the hazard at which it is directed and the conduct required of the operator to remedy such hazard." In short, the operator must have clear notice of the conduct required of him.

In SOCCO, an inspector issued a citation after finding water 10 inches in depth from rib to rib at a stopping located along a belt conveyor. Because of the presence of the water, the inspector believed that a clear travelway of 24 inches was not provided along the conveyor belt as required by a previously issued safeguard notice. The safeguard notice was issued after the inspector found fallen rock and cement blocks at three locations along a conveyor belt. Addressing the question as to whether the safeguard notice referencing "fallen rock and cement blocks at three locations," and requiring 24 inches of clearance on both sides of the conveyor belt, should have put SOCCO on notice that conditions such as the water described in the citation fell within the safeguard's prohibitions, the Commission concluded that it did not. In this regard, the Commission stated as follows at 7 FMSHRC:

Given the frequency of wet ground conditions in the mine, and the basic dissimilarity between such conditions and solid obstructions such as rocks and debris, we find that SOCCO was not given sufficient notice by the underlying safeguard notice issued in 1978 that either wet conditions in general or the particular conditions cited in 1983 by the inspector in this case would violate the underlying safeguard notice's terms.

We do not hold that a safeguard notice pertaining to hazardous conditions caused by wetness could not be issued. Conditions such as those cited by the inspector here, if hazardous, can just as readily be eliminated by issuance of safeguard notices specifically addressing such conditions. By taking this approach rather than bootstrapping dissimilar hazards into previously issued safeguard notices, the operator's right to notice of conditions that violate the law and subject it to penalties can be protected with no undue infringement of the Secretary's authority or loss of miner safety.
In a footnote at 7 FMSHRC 512, the Commission made the following observation: "The requirements of specificity and narrow interpretation are not a license for the raising or acceptance of purely semantic arguments. . . . We recognize that safeguards are written by inspectors in the field, not by a team of lawyers."

In Secretary of Labor v. U.S. Steel Mining Company, Inc., 4 FMSHRC 526, 529-530, (March 1982), Chief Judge Merlin made the following observations with respect to section 75.1403 safeguard notices:

** Safeguards are designed to cover situations where conditions vary on a mine-to-mine basis. Mandatory standards cannot anticipate every possible physical condition in every mine and therefore with respect to the transportation of men and materials the Act allows flexibility. By means of a safeguard MSHA can impose certain requirements on a particular mine which are peculiar to that mine because of its physical configuration and circumstances. However, in order to be fair to the operator by giving due notice, the requirements being imposed upon its mine are set forth first in the safeguard notice which carries no civil penalty. Only in the subsequent citation based upon the safeguard can a penalty be imposed. In the area of transportation of men and materials, safeguards embody and effectuate flexibility and adaptability to individual circumstances in the administration of the Act. However, the potential scope of safeguards is very broad and accordingly, care must be taken to ensure that they are employed only in the proper context and do not become a means whereby the normal rule-making process is ignored and circumvented.

In Secretary of Labor v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., Docket No. SE 84-23, 6 FMSHRC 1815, July 30, 1984, Chief Judge Merlin affirmed a citation issued to the respondent for a violation of section 75.1403-8(d), for failing to keep its track clearance free of rails, crib blocks, and timbers. The inspector who issued the violation relied on the same safeguard notice used by the inspector in the instant Docket No. SE 85-59. In affirming the violation, Judge Merlin ruled that the cited safeguard criteria "is plainly mandatory and the
language used is easily susceptible of objective interpretation and uniform application," 6 FMSHRC 1818. Judge Merlin's decision with respect to the citation was not appealed. His ruling vacating another citation involving a safeguard notice for a belt conveyor was reversed by the Commission in a decision issued on April 29, 1985, 7 FMSHRC 493.

I believe a reading of the Commission's "safeguard notice" decisions makes it clear that adequately written safeguards are mandatory standards or requirements which are enforceable on a mine-by-mine basis, and the respondent concedes that this is the case (Tr. 58). Respondent's argument that safeguard notices are "advisory opinions" by an inspector and therefore unenforceable is rejected. Simply because an inspector may give advice or make recommendations to a mine operator while in the mine during an inspection does not mean that the subsequent use of the word "should" on the face of any safeguard notice that he may issue renders the safeguard less than mandatory or unenforceable.

In the instant cases, the inspectors who issued the safeguards simply included the specific language of the regulatory criteria found in sections 75.1403-6 and 75.1403-8, as part of the safeguard notice. Since the criteria use the word "should," it was included as part of the safeguard. However, the safeguard form makes it clear to me that the respondent was required to comply with its terms, and I construe it to be a directive and not simply advice. Although the form contains the words "recommended safeguards," the words "Notice to Provide Safeguards" is in bold print, and the operator is put on notice that the inspector who inspected his mine directs him to comply with the safeguards as stated on the face of the form. The operator is also put on notice that his failure to comply with the safeguard will result in the issuance of a withdrawal order. Under the circumstances, the respondent's assertion that the safeguards issued in these cases were simply advisory recommendations by the inspectors rather than enforceable mandatory requirements is rejected.

The respondent's suggestion that the use of the word "should" in the regulatory criteria found in sections 75.1403-6 and 75.1403-8 render them advisory and unenforceable as mandatory standards is rejected. Section 75.1403, which is a statutory provision, mandates that adequate safeguards to minimize transportation hazards shall be provided, and section 75.1403-1 provides the mechanism and framework for notifying an operator as to the specific safeguard requirements which it is expected to follow for its mine. I conclude and find that the regulatory safeguard criteria in
question are intended to be construed as mandatory rather than advisory requirements.

In Secretary of Labor v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. and Cowin and Company, 3 FMSHRC 2488 (November 1981), the Commission held that 30 C.F.R. § 77.1903(b), was not a mandatory safety standard imposing a mandatory duty on a mine operator. The standard required that certain ANSI specifications for the use of wire ropes used for hoisting in a mine be followed, and it mandated that these specifications shall be used as a guide in the use, selection and maintenance of such ropes. The Commission determined that the phrase "shall be used as a guide" was, at best, ambiguous. It noted that the standard contained mandatory language, i.e., "shall be used," but took note of the fact that the requirement imposed was the use of ANSI standards "as a guide." The Commission concluded that in common usage a "guide" was something less than a mandatory requirement to be followed, and in view of the ambiguous regulatory language, as well as the ambiguous nature of many of the underlying ANSI standards, it concluded that the Secretary's attempt to derive an enforceable mandatory duty from the standard to be unreasonable. The Commission found fault with the wording of the standard and concluded that it did not adequately inform an operator of a duty that must be met.

While it is true that the language found under the general safeguard regulatory criteria found in section 75.1403-1(b), states that an inspector relying on the criteria set out in sections 75.1403-2 through 75.1403-11, will be guided by those criteria in requiring other safeguards on a mine-by-mine basis, the fact is that the criteria enumerated in those sections specifically delineate what is required for compliance. Unlike the ambiguous ANSI standards, I cannot conclude that the safeguard criteria suffer from any ambiguity. They specifically address the particular subject matter covered by each of the criteria sections.

Fact of Violation - Docket No. SE 85-60 - Citation No. 2483944

In this case, the respondent is charged with a failure to maintain an operative sanding device on a man bus used to transport seven miners from the section. The safeguard criteria for personnel carriers found at 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-6(b)(3), requires that such carriers be equipped with properly installed and well-maintained sanding devices. The inspector found that the sanding device reservoirs for the cited bus were empty and that the sand passed through the
lines onto the track while the bus was parked. The respondent does not dispute these facts, and the citation was abated when the bus was removed from the mine in order to repair the sanding device.

The previously issued safeguard notice, 1 T.L.M., issued by Inspector Meredith on October 19, 1976, states as follows:

The B-1 mantrip bus and the J-1 also (sic) J-2 Jitneys used to haul men as mantrip jitneys were not provided with operative sanding devices.

Self-propelled personnel carriers should be equipped with properly installed and well maintained sanding devices, except that personnel carriers (Jitneys), which transport not more than 5 men, need not be equipped with such sanding devices.

The requirements of the safeguard criteria found in section 75.1403-6(b)(3), for personnel carriers provides as follows:

(b) * * * [E]ach track-mounted self-propelled personnel carrier should:

* * * * * * *

(3) Be equipped with properly installed and well-maintained sanding devices, except that personnel carriers (Jitneys), which transport not more than 5 men, need not be equipped with such sanding device; * * *

In issuing the citation in this case, the inspector relied on a previously issued safeguard notice issued by Inspector Meredith on October 20, 1976, at the No. 3 Mine. The inspector who issued the citation cited a violation of the general safeguard provisions of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403, and he did not include any reference to the specific criteria requirements found in section 75.1403-6(b)(3). However, he did describe in detail the specific condition for which the citation was issued, and as indicated earlier, the man bus was removed from service so that the sanding device could be repaired.

When the original safeguard notice was issued in 1976, Inspector Meredith noted that one man bus and two jitneys
used as mantrips "were not provided with operative sanding devices." Mr. Meredith did not specify the specific conditions which rendered the sanding devices less than operative, and while his notice makes no regulatory reference to section 75.1403-6(b)(3), and simply cited section 75.1403, Mr. Meredith included a verbatim quote of the criteria requirements on the face of the notice. Mr. Meredith explained that he omitted any reference to section 75.1403-6(b)(3), because the citation forms in use in 1976 did not provide a space for this reference, and only provided for a citation to the regulatory section and subpart i.e., Sec. 75.1403, Subpart O.

During the course of the hearing, MSHA's counsel conceded that the conditions cited in the citation issued in this case must be substantially the same kind of conditions that were described in the original safeguard notice (Tr. 35). He stated that the only issue presented here is whether or not the citation provided the respondent with adequate notice as to what he had to do to maintain compliance. As long as the respondent is on notice that a safeguard notice is in effect, the requirements of the law have been met (Tr. 48).

With regard to the lack of reference to the specific safeguard criteria dealing with mantrips as found in section 75.1403-6(b)(3), MSHA's counsel asserted that anyone in the mining industry is presumed to be familiar with the general mandatory requirements of sections 75.1403 and 75.1403-1, as well as the enumerated criteria which follow, and that these must be considered collectively as mandated requirements which must be followed. In support of his position, MSHA's counsel pointed out that the respondent had previously received citations in September 1979, for violations of section 75.1403, because of the lack of operative sanding devices on its personnel carriers in the No. 3 Mine, and in each instance the inspector who issued those citations made reference to the previously issued October 19, 1976, safeguard notice issued by Inspector Meredith. Since those citations were not contested by the respondent, counsel argued that respondent was on notice as to the mandatory requirements of the safeguards, and had adequate notice as to the requirements in question (Exhibit G-2, Tr. 55).

I take note of the fact that in each of the previously issued citations in 1979, the inspector initially failed to cite a violation of section 75.1403-6(b)(3), and simply cited section 75.1403 as the violative regulatory section. However, he subsequently modified the citations to show a violation of section 75.1403-6(b)(3), rather than section 75.1403. I also note that in all three instances, the inspector failed
to detail what was wrong with the sanding devices and simply stated that the mantrips were not provided with an operating sanding device. Further, in his narrative findings concerning the gravity of the violations, the inspector indicated that in the event the personnel carriers "hit a wet rail or slick spot it needed something to slow it down," and that if it hit a slick spot it could "get out of control." Abatement was achieved by providing the cited carriers with "operating sanding devices."

In Secretary of Labor v. Mathies Coal Company, 4 FMSHRC 1111 (1982), Judge Lasher affirmed a citation which was issued for a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403. The citation was based on the inspector's finding that one of four sanding devices provided for a self-propelled personnel carrier was inoperative. The inspector described the "inoperative" sander as follows: "The sander was empty due to valve that was stuck open." The underlying safeguard notice relied on by the inspector required that "all mantrips be provided with properly maintained sanding devices sufficient to sand all wheels in both directions of travel." Although an appeal was taken on Judge Lasher's "significant and substantial" finding, his ruling on the fact of violation was not appealed. The Commission subsequently affirmed Judge Lasher's decision, 6 FMSHRC 1 (1984).

The criteria language found in section 75.1403-6(b)(3), requires that personnel carriers be equipped with properly installed and well-maintained sanding devices. Although the term "well maintained" is rather general, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines the word "maintain" in pertinent part as "to keep in an existing state (as of repair, efficiency); preserve from failure or decline (machinery); to sustain against * * * danger; * * *." In the instant case, the respondent does not dispute the fact that the sanding device in question was not in an operative condition at the time it was cited by the inspector. It seems obvious to me that the failure of the sanding device reservoir to retain its supply of sand while the bus was parked rendered it less than operative, and I find that the failure to insure that the sand did not escape from the reservoir supports a conclusion that the sanding device was not well maintained. Had the bus been placed in operation with no sand in its sanding device reservoir, it seems logical to me that the sanding device would be useless.

While it is true that the inspector who issued the disputed citation in this case failed to refer to section 75.1403-6(b)(3), on the face of the citation, he did cite
section 75.1403, and he specifically cited the prior safeguard notice issued on October 19, 1976. In addition, by specifically describing the condition which rendered the sanding device less than operative, the respondent was put on notice as to what was required to correct the condition. The safeguard notice, as well as the intervening citations, should have alerted the respondent of the requirement for maintaining operative sanding devices on its personnel carriers.

I conclude that the safeguard notice, coupled with the subsequently issued violations which were not contested, adequately informed the respondent as to the requirements for maintaining the sanding devices on its personnel carriers in an operative condition. Although the prior inspectors should have detailed the particular conditions which rendered the previously cited sanding devices inoperative, as did the inspector who issued the citation in this case, the fact that they did not do so does not render the citation or the safeguard notice less than adequate to inform the respondent as to what it was required to do. The prior violative conditions were abated, and I conclude that the "inoperative sanding device" condition cited in this case was substantially the same as the condition cited in the original safeguard notice, and in both instances the sanding devices were repaired so as to render them operative. Under the circumstances, I conclude and find that a violation has been established, and the citation IS AFFIRMED.

Fact of Violation - Docket No. SE 85-59 - Citation No. 2310757

In this case, the respondent is charged with a failure to provide adequate clearance on a track section over which men and materials were transported. The inspector found two timbers lying along the track, and he found a material car parked in the track "kick-back" which was loaded with timbers which hung over a man bus that was operating on the track. The inspector relied on a previously issued safeguard notice, and cited a violation of the track haulage road safeguard criteria found in section 75.1403-8(d), which provides as follows: "(d) The clearance space on all track haulage roads should be kept free of loose rock, supplies, and other loose materials."

The criteria found in subsection (b) of section 75.1403-8, provides as follows:

(b) Track haulage roads should have a continuous clearance on one side of at least 237
24 inches from the farthest projection of normal traffic. Where it is necessary to change the side on which clearance is provided, 24 inches of clearance should be provided on both sides for a distance of not less than 100 feet and warning signs should be posted at such locations.

The previously issued safeguard notice, 1 T.J.I., issued by Inspector Ingram on July 27, 1976, states as follows:

Several locations along the track haulage ways that were used for travel had clearance less than 24 inches. Refuse, loose rock and supplies (sic) obstructed the available clearance in the provided walkway. Signs were not provided in places where the clearance side could be changed.

The track haulage roads should have a continuous clearance on one side of at least 24 inches from the farthest projection of normal traffic. Where it is necessary to change the side on which clearance is provided, 24 inches of clearance should be provided on both sides for a distance of not less than 100 feet and warning signs should be posted at such locations.

Track haulage roads developed after March 30, 1970, should have clearance on the "tight" side of at least 12 inches from the farthest projection of the normal traffic. A minimum clearance of 6 inches should be maintained on the "tight" side of all track haulage roads developed prior to March 30, 1970.

The clearance space on all track haulage roads should be kept free of loose rock, supplies and other loose materials.

The parties advance the same arguments with respect to the adequacy of the safeguard notice as those stated in the previous case. MSHA produced copies of 13 citations and one order issued at the No. 3 Mine at various times during 1977, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984, for obstructions on the respondent's track haulage system. In each instance the issuing inspectors cited a violation of section 75.1403-8(b) or (d), and with one exception, the inspectors relied on the
previously issued safeguard notice issued by Inspector Ingram. The variety of conditions cited include track obstructions caused by crib blocks, loose rock, chain link fencing materials, concrete blocks, pipe, rails, trash, and in 10 cases loose timbers were included among the materials cited for the obstruction of the track or the failure to maintain the required clearances noted in the safeguard notice. In each instance, the violations were abated by the cleanup and removal of the materials.

Although the safeguard notice issued by Inspector Ingram makes reference to an obstructed walkway along the mine track haulageways, and makes no specific reference to section 75.1403-8(d), it specifically required that adequate clearances be maintained along the track haulage, and that the track haulage roads be kept free of loose rock, supplies and other loose materials. Mr. Ingram testified that he issued the safeguard after finding the main track haulageway cluttered and the clearance side of the track obstructed, and he confirmed that he discussed the matter with the respondent’s safety inspector (Tr 39-40). Mr. Ingram also confirmed that the safeguard notice is still in effect at the mine, and that he would continue to rely on it in issuing citations for conditions similar to those stated in the safeguard (Tr. 44).

I conclude and find that the timbers which obstructed the cited track area in question in this case fall within the category of supplies or other loose materials noted in section 75.1403-8(d), and that they were conditions similar to the conditions cited in the safeguard. Respondent does not dispute the existence of the timbers, nor does it dispute the fact that the protruding timbers obstructed the track. Inspector McAnally’s testimony, which I find credible, establishes that the timbers not only obstructed the track, but that the man bus "bumped" the timbers, and Mr. McAnally had to contort his body to avoid being struck by the protruding timbers. Respondent offered no testimony or evidence to rebut Mr. McAnally’s testimony.

MSHA’s counsel argues that it is clear from the record that the track area in question was obstructed, and that since Mr. McAnally found that there was no track clearance, or less than 24 inches of clearance because of the protruding timbers, his reliance on the previously issued safeguard notice was proper (Tr. 35-36).

I conclude that the safeguard notice issued by Inspector Ingram, as well as the citation issued by Mr. McAnally relying on that safeguard, adequately informed the respondent as
to what was required to maintain compliance with the cited regulatory standard. I take particular note of the fact that the citations issued subsequent to the safeguard notice included specific references to timbers which obstructed the track haulageways in the No. 3 Mine, and in each instances respondent corrected the conditions by removing the materials. I find nothing in this record to suggest that the respondent was confused as to the requirements of the safeguard relied on by Mr. McAnally, nor do I find any basis for concluding that the safeguard was other than adequate. Under the circumstances, I conclude and find that a violation has been established, and the citation IS AFFIRMED.

Significant and Substantial Violations

Citation No. 2483944

In arriving at his decision that the inoperative sanding device violation in the Mathies Coal Company case, supra, was "significant and substantial," Judge Lasher discussed in some detail the conditions which prevailed at the time the citation was issued. Judge Lasher made credibility findings and resolved disputed testimony concerning the track curves, grades, whether the tracks were wet, the braking capacity of the mantrip, the mechanics of the sanding device, etc., and the Commission affirmed his findings in this regard.

In the instant case, the inspector who issued the sanding device citation was unavailable for trial because he was out of state on other MSHA business. Under the circumstances, there is no testimony or evidence as to the actual underground conditions which prevailed at the time the citation was issued. Although the parties stipulated to the fact that the sanding device was inoperative, and that the inspector was correct when he marked the gravity portion of the citation "reasonably likely," and "lost workdays or restricted duty," there is no factual or evidentiary basis to support the inspector's "significant and substantial" finding. Under the circumstances, I conclude that the petitioner has failed to establish that the violation was "significant and substantial," and the inspector's finding in this regard IS VACATED.

Citation No. 2310757

The testimony and evidence in this case establishes that the parked protruding timbers obstructed the track and posed a hazard to the miners who were riding in the man bus. The inspector's unrebutted testimony established that the bus "bumped" the timbers and that the inspector had to move to
avoid being struck by the timbers. Under the circumstances, I conclude and find that the violation exposed the miners riding in the man bus to a reasonable likelihood of being struck by the timbers and being seriously injured while riding along the track. Accordingly, the inspector's "significant and substantial" finding is affirmed.

**History of Prior Violations**

The petitioner filed no information concerning the respondent's history of prior violations. Although the parties stipulated that the respondent has an "average" history of prior violations, I have no idea what this means. Accordingly, for purposes of any civil penalty assessments for the citations, I cannot conclude that the respondent's compliance history warrants any additional increases or decreases. In the future, the petitioner will be expected to make some meaningful input with respect to this statutory standard.

**Size of Business and Effect of Civil Penalties on the Respondent's Ability to Continue in Business**

The parties stipulated that the respondent is a medium-size operator and that the imposition of civil penalties will not affect its ability to continue in business. I adopt these stipulations as my findings and conclusions on these issues.

**Good Faith Abatement**

The parties stipulated that the cited conditions were abated in good faith by the respondent. I agree and conclude that the respondent exercised good faith in abating the violations.

**Negligence**

I conclude and find that the respondent knew or should have known of the requirements for maintaining an obstruction-free track and ensuring that its personnel carrier sanding device was in operative condition. The safeguard notices, as well as the subsequently issued citations, provided ample notice to the respondent as to what was expected to maintain compliance with the cited standards. I conclude and find that the respondent was negligent, and that the violations resulted from the failure by the respondent to exercise reasonable care. In view of the number and frequency of violations because of timbers and other clutter on its track system, it
would appear to me that the respondent needs to give closer attention to its preventive measures in this regard.

Gravity

I conclude and find that the sanding device citation was serious. The lack of an operative sanding device would obviously affect the safe operation of the man bus. The obstructed track posed a serious hazard to the men riding the track in a man bus, and I consider this violation to be extremely serious.

Civil Penalty Assessments

On the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions, and taking into account the requirements of section 110(i) of the Act, I conclude that the following civil penalty assessments are appropriate and reasonable for the citations which have been affirmed:

Docket No. SE 85-60

Citation No. 2483944, January 22, 1985, 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403--$150.

Docket No. SE 85-59

Citation No. 2310757, June 15, 1984, 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403-8(d)--$600.

ORDER

The respondent IS ORDERED to pay the assessed civil penalties within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision. Payment is to be made to MSHA, and upon receipt of same, these proceedings are dismissed.

George A. Koutras
Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:

George D. Palmer, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 2015 Second Avenue North, Suite 201, Birmingham, AL 35203 (Certified Mail)

Robert Stanley Morrow, Esq., Jim Walter Resources, Inc., P.O. Box C-79, Birmingham, AL 35283 (Certified Mail)

Harold D. Rice, Esq., Jim Walter Resources, Inc., P.O. Box C-79, Birmingham, AL 35283 (Certified Mail)

H. Gerald Reynolds, Esq., Jim Walter Corporation, P.O. Box 22601, Tampa, FL 33622 (Certified Mail)

/fb
This case is before me upon a petition for assessment of civil penalty under Section 105(d) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Act). A hearing in this matter was convened in Wheeling, West Virginia on January 8, 1986. At that time, the parties advised me of a proposed settlement disposition of the dispute and jointly moved for approval of a settlement agreement and dismissal of the case. The violation in this case was originally assessed at $240 and the parties propose to reduce the penalty to $160. I have considered the representations and documentation submitted in this case, and I conclude that the proffered settlement is appropriate under the criteria set forth in Section 110(i) of the Act.

WHEREFORE, the motion for approval of a settlement is GRANTED and it is ORDERED that Respondent pay a penalty of $160 within 30 days of this decision. Upon payment, these proceedings are DISMISSED.

Roy J. Maurer
Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:

Patrick M. Zohn, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 1240 East Ninth Street, Cleveland, OH 44199 (Certified Mail)

Robert Kota, Esq., Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Company, P.O. Box 1000, St. Clairsville, OH 43950 (Certified Mail)
ORDER

During the course of the hearing held in this matter in Abingdon, Virginia, on November 13, 1985, MSHA's counsel offered exhibits C-9 and C-10, which are computer print-outs detailing the respondent's history of civil penalty assessments for the period August 23, 1982 through August 22, 1984. Exhibit C-9 is the compliance record for the respondent Raven Red Ash Coal Corporation, and exhibit C-10 is the compliance record for all mines operated by Mr. David Jordan, President of the Raven Red Ash Coal Corporation.

Respondent's counsel raised an objection to the relevancy and accuracy of the information contained in the exhibits, and he argued that some of the dates reflected on the print-outs are for periods during which the respondent's mine was operated under a different corporate name, namely the Virginia and West Virginia Coal Corporation. Respondent's counsel raised a question concerning the corporate ownership of the Virginia and West Virginia Coal Corporation, and suggested that any prior citations attributable to that corporate entity should not be considered as part of the history of compliance for the respondent Raven Red Ash Coal Corporation.

I reserved any ruling on the admissibility of exhibits C-9 and C-10, and permitted the parties an opportunity to file further arguments on the questions raised.
By letter and enclosures filed with me on January 9, 1986, MSHA's counsel has submitted further arguments on the question concerning the respondent's history of prior violations. Counsel has also submitted proposed exhibits C-11, C-12, C-13, and C-14, which are copies of MSHA Legal Identity Reports and related correspondence reflecting Mr. Jordan's corporate ownership and/or interest in the Virginia and West Virginia Coal Corporation and the Raven Red Ash Coal Corporation. Proposed exhibit C-15 is an MSHA document explaining the various computer codes and column headings as shown on the computer print-outs. Counsel requests that all of these exhibits, including the disputed exhibits C-9 and C-10, be received in evidence and made a part of the record in this proceeding.

The respondent has not responded to MSHA's letter of January 9, 1986, and has filed no additional arguments with respect to the history of prior violations issue. By letter dated January 16, 1986, respondent's counsel advised that the respondent will stand on the present record and will not file any additional briefs in this matter.

Upon due consideration of the submissions made by MSHA's counsel on January 9, 1986, I conclude and find that the information submitted is relevant to this proceeding. In the event that I find a violation of section 105(c) of the Act has been established, the respondent's history of prior violations is relevant to any civil penalty assessment which may be assessed by me for the violation. Accordingly, MSHA's request to receive exhibits C-9 through C-15 as part of the record in this case IS GRANTED, and the respondent's objections ARE DENIED.

George A. Koutras
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:
Sheila K. Cronan, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 4015 Wilson Boulevard, Room 1237A, Arlington, VA 22203 (Certified Mail)
Daniel R. Bieger, Esq., Copeland, Molinary & Bieger, P.O. Box 1296, Abingdon, VA 24210 (Certified Mail)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Before: Judge Melick

The Complainant, Gary Lamb, seeks to withdraw his Com­
plainant in the captioned cases based on a settlement agreement
with Respondent. Under the circumstances herein, permission
to withdraw is granted. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.11. The cases are
therefore dismissed.

Gary Melick
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Mr. Gary L. Lamb, Sr., P.O. Box 404, McRoberts, KY 41835
(Certified Mail)

Gerald L. Gray, Esq., McClure Avenue, P.O. Box 929, Clintwood,
VA 24228 (Certified Mail)

Michael T. Heenan, Esq., and Ronald E. Meisburg, Esq., Smith,
Heenan & Althen, 1110 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC
20005 (Certified Mail)
SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),
Petitioner
v.
NALLY & HAYDON, INC., Respondent

CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
Docket No. KENT 85-199-M
A. C. No. 15-00037-05501

Docket No. KENT 85-200-M
A. C. No. 15-00037-05502

Hurricane Gap Quarry Mine
Docket No. KENT 85-201-M
A. C. No. 15-00071-05504

Harlan Mine

DECISION APPROVING SETTLEMENT

Before: Judge Kennedy

This matter is before me on the parties' amended motion to approve settlement by increasing the amount of the settlement proposed from $1,377 to $7,305.

Based on an independent evaluation and res nova review of the circumstances, I find the settlement, as now proposed, is in accord with the purposes and policy of the Act.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the operator pay the amount of the settlement agreed upon, $7,305, on or before Friday, March 21, 1986, and that subject to payment the captioned matter be DISMISSED.

Joel B. Kennedy
Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:

Joseph B. Luckett, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U. S. Department of Labor, 280 U. S. Courthouse, 801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203 (Certified Mail)

Albert Haydon, President, Nally & Haydon, Inc., P. O. Box 70, Bardstown, KY 40004 (Certified Mail)

dcp
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),
Petitioner

v.

RUFUS BALDWIN,
Respondent

CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING

Docket No. VA 84-43
A.O. No. 44-03868-03520-A

CC&P Coal Co. No. 1 Mine

DECISION


Before: Judge Maurer

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This proceeding concerns a proposal for assessment of civil penalty filed by the petitioner against the respondent pursuant to Section 110(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the "Act"), 30 U.S.C. § 820(c), seeking a civil penalty assessment of $500. More particularly, it is alleged that on October 20, 1982, the respondent, acting as an agent of the corporate mine operator, CC and P Coal Company, within the meaning and scope of Sections 3(e) and 110(c) of the Act, knowingly authorized, ordered or carried out the corporate mine operator's violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.511, as stated in Section 104(d)(1) Citation No. 2071403. Said Citation, as modified, states as follows:

Electric work was performed on the 220 volt control circuit on the Lee Norse 245 continuous mining machine without opening and locking out the disconnecting device. A fatal machinery accident occurred.

On October 27, 1983, the CC and P Coal Company paid a civil penalty assessment of $2,000 for the foregoing violation (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9).
The respondent herein contested the violation and the proposed civil penalty assessment. Therefore, pursuant to notice, a hearing was convened in Falls Church, Virginia, on December 10, 1985, and while the petitioner appeared, the respondent did not. In spite of the respondent's failure to appear, the hearing on the merits proceeded without him. For reasons discussed later in this decision, respondent is held to be in default, and is deemed to have waived his opportunity to be further heard in this matter.

**APPLICABLE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS**


**ISSUES**

The issues presented in this case are whether the petitioner has established a violation of Section 30 C.F.R. § 75.511 and that this respondent as an agent of CC and P Coal Company, knowingly authorized, ordered or carried out that violation; and if so, the appropriate civil penalty that should be assessed.

**PETITIONER'S CASE**

Petitioner introduced the following exhibits that were received in evidence in this proceeding:

3. A copy of a letter dated November 5, 1982, from CC and P to MSHA establishing interstate commerce.
4. A copy of the Section 104(a) Citation No. 2071403, issued on October 21, 1982.
5. A copy of the modification of Citation No. 2071403 to a 104(d)(1) citation, dated October 27, 1982.
6. A copy of the abatement of Citation No. 2071403 dated October 27, 1982.

7. A copy of a Memorandum of Record to the District Manager from Roy D. Davidson concerning the fatal accident of October 20, 1982.


10. A computer printout certified by the Office of Assessments of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, showing that the civil penalties, assessed by the ALJ in Exhibit No. 9, supra, were paid by the corporate operator, CC and P Coal Co.

Mr. Roy D. Davidson appeared and testified on behalf of the petitioner. He is an electrical engineer employed by MSHA in Northern Virginia and as such has been involved in coal mine accident investigations for some ten (10) years. He investigated the fatal accident which is the subject of this case and co-authored the final version of the Report of Investigation (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 8).

The substance of his testimony was that Mr. Baldwin, respondent herein, was performing some electrical work on the start-stop switches that control the ripper heads, conveyor chain and pump motor of the continuous miner at the time the fatal accident occurred. This was a low-voltage circuit and Baldwin was performing this work without opening and locking-out the disconnecting device. In Mr. Davidson's opinion it was Baldwin's responsibility to see to it that the disconnecting device was open and locked out per 30 C.F.R. § 75.511. He also believes that this is common knowledge in the mining industry and therefore that Baldwin knew it was required and also knew there was power on the machine just prior to the accident.

At the time of the accident, Baldwin was employed at CC and P Coal Company as a section foreman and also a certified electrician and the electrician of the section. The accident victim, Orville Terry Cooper, worked for Baldwin on his crew.
The disconnecting device was located at the power center, approximately 250 feet away from the continuous mining machine. The effect of opening up and locking out the disconnecting device is that it provides positive assurance that the power has been removed from the continuous mining machine.

Mr. Davidson reconstructed the accident on the record as follows: On the morning of October 20, 1982, at approximately 8:00 A.M., the section crew with Mr. Baldwin as the section foreman entered the mine. They arrived on the section at approximately 8:30 A.M. This particular Lee Norse continuous mining machine had had electrical problems for several months with the ripper heads, conveyor belt and pump motor coming on inadvertently. It also had had intermittent problems with stopping the ripper heads. Baldwin knew of this and was directly involved with these problems. On the day of the accident, the previous shift had already worked on the continuous miner all night, and the ripper heads had been raised into an upper position and were supported by wooden blocks. The morning of the accident, Baldwin removed a control panel on the mining machine to work on the methane monitor and he assigned Tim Elswick, the scoop operator, to go to the power center and "kill the main power supply." After correcting the problem with the methane monitor, Baldwin put the control panel back and replaced the cover on the main control panel in the operator's deck. After work on the methane monitor system was completed, electric power was restored at the power center. Immediately prior to the accident, Baldwin was preparing to install some insulating paper behind the start-stop switches to prevent the switches from contacting the inside of the switch control panel and becoming shorted across. Terry Rose, working with and for Baldwin, raised the ripper heads to remove the wooden blocks and then let the ripper heads come down to the floor. This fact in and of itself would indicate to all, including Baldwin, that there was power on the machine. It had been turned back on. Prior to commencing work on the switches, Baldwin had assigned three (3) of his men, including the victim, Cooper, to tighten the ripper chain while he and Rose worked on the start-stop switches. They were so engaged when at approximately 9:30 A.M. as Baldwin was removing the switch from its mounting location, the rippers suddenly started, catching Cooper, who was bending over the rippers assisting in tightening the ripper chain adjustment bolt, and fatally injuring him.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE HEARING

The record in this case reflects numerous attempts to establish contact by mail or telephone with Mr. Baldwin on
the part of both myself and counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Smith. He has never contacted either myself or Mr. Smith to indicate his desires or his position with regard to the issues in this case. The only communication from him in this record is an undated "Answer" that states that he does not disagree with the violation, only with the gravity of the violation and recites that he cannot afford to pay $500.

On the morning of the hearing (December 10, 1985), which was "noticed" on October 17, 1985, Mrs. Baldwin called Mr. Smith to explain that her husband would not be at the hearing that morning because his car was broken down in Alabama, where he now works. She was unable to provide a telephone number to call Mr. Baldwin, either at home or at work.

Under the circumstances in this record, which include at least three attempts (all unsuccessful) to communicate with Mr. Baldwin subsequent to his belatedly filing an "Answer," I conclude and find that he has waived his right to be heard further in this matter and that he is in default.

Although Commission Rule 29 C.F.R. § 2700.63 calls for the issuance of a Show Cause Order before a party is defaulted, given the facts of this case where the respondent has repeatedly failed to respond or otherwise communicate with me or counsel for petitioner, I conclude that the issuance of such an order would be a futile gesture.

FACT OF VIOLATION

I conclude and find that the petitioner has established a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.511 by a preponderance of the evidence. Respondent himself, by his "Answer" does not "disagree" with the facts of the violation. In any event, the evidence is undisputed that electrical work was being performed by Baldwin on a low voltage circuit without opening and locking out the disconnecting device.

Negligence

Mr. Davidson testified that it is common knowledge in the coal mining industry that when you perform electrical work on a piece of machinery, you must open and lock out the disconnecting device. It was Mr. Baldwin's responsibility to do this. He knew there was power on the machine. He knew the machine had a history of electrical difficulties. Yet he assigned three of the men on his crew to work on the ripper chain, which required them to place themselves in close proximity to the rippers while he performed electrical work on the start-stop switches for the rippers. I conclude and find that this constitutes an extremely high degree of negligence.
Gravity

I find that this violation was extremely serious. It was the direct cause of a fatality.

History of Prior Violations

Counsel for petitioner has stated and I find that Mr. Baldwin, personally, has no history of prior violations.

Section 110(c) Criteria

The undisputed evidence in this case establishes without any question that Mr. Baldwin, the individual respondent herein, was the agent of CC and P Coal Company and as such did personally and knowingly authorize, order and carry out the violation of § 75.511 cited in this instance.

Civil Penalty Assessment

The violation in this case was assessed by MSHA at $500. This was amended at the hearing to $1,000 by counsel for petitioner. I fully concur that $1,000 would be a reasonable penalty for the egregious violation in this case. However, because of the default nature of the proceeding and because it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Baldwin reasonably expected his penalty would be limited to the maximum of which he had notice, and taking into account the requirements of Section 110(i) of the Act, I conclude that a civil penalty assessment of $500 will adequately serve the public interest.

ORDER

The respondent IS ORDERED to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500 for the violation in question, and payment is to be made to MSHA within thirty (30) days of the date of this decision and order. Upon receipt of payment by the petitioner, this case is dismissed.

Roy J. Maurer
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:


Mr. Rufus Baldwin, Post Office Box 146, Peterson, AL 35478 (Certified Mail)

db 256
SECRETARY OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA), 
Petitioner v. 
ST. JOE MINERALS CORP., Respondent 

ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT

Before: Judge Broderick

On February 13, 1986, Petitioner and Respondent filed a joint motion to approve a settlement agreement originally assessed at $7000 propose to settle for $5000.

The violation charged was failure to take down loose slabs of pillar which resulted in a fatal accident. The motion states that Respondent's negligence originally judged as moderate was in fact low, because the evidence shows that Respondent repeatedly advised employees to avoid the area of the mine where the accident occurred. The violation was very serious. I accept the representation in the motion and conclude that the settlement should be approved.

Accordingly, the settlement is APPROVED and Respondent is ORDERED TO PAY the sum of $5000 within 30 days of the date of this order.

James A. Broderick
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Tobias B. Fritz, Esq., U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, 911 Walnut St., Kansas City, MO 64106 (Certified Mail)

Richard J. Ashby, Esq., P.O. Box 500, Viburnum, MO 65566 (Certified Mail)

slk
These cases are petitions for the assessment of civil penalties filed under section 110(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act ("the Act") by the Secretary of Labor against Phelps Dodge Corporation/Tyrone Branch, for alleged violations of the mandatory safety standards.

Stipulation

At the hearing, the parties agreed to the consolidation for hearing and decision of the two docket numbers (Tr. 3).

They also agreed to the following stipulations (Tr. 4):

(1) Phelps Dodge, Tyrone Mine and Mill, are subject to the Act and that MSHA has safety and health jurisdiction over them;

(2) the citations were duly issued and served by MSHA;

(3) there were 57,120,000 tons of ore and waste from the mine at the Tyrone Mine during the calendar year 1984;

(4) the Tyrone Mine and Mill is a large open pit operation;
imposition of a penalty in either or both cases would not impair Phelps Dodge's ability to remain in business.

Based upon the print-out submitted (MSHA Exhibit P-3) I find the operator's prior history of violations is good.

**Cent 85-19-M**

**Citation No. 2092265**

The subject citation dated October 10, 1984, describes the allegedly violative condition or practice as follows:

The company posted a list "miner representative" dated 10/4/84 on top of the miner representative list received by MSHA dated 10/1/84. The company list has two additional names dated April 7, 1980 and the other 12/26/83. A copy of the most current status list presented to the company and MSHA is only posted at the safety office bulletin board where not all employees can observe the list of the miners representing them. Tony Trujillo said he made up this list.

30 C.F.R. § 40.3 provides as follows:

(a) The following information shall be filed by a representative of miners with the appropriate District Manager, with copies to the operators of the affected mines. This information shall be kept current.

(1) The name, address and telephone number of the representative of miners. If the representative is an organization, the name, address and telephone number of the organization and the title of the official or position who is to serve as the representative and his or her telephone number.

Section 40.4 provides that:

**Posting at Mine**

A copy of the information provided the operator pursuant to § 40.3 of this part shall be posted upon receipt by the operator on the mine bulletin board and maintained in a current status.
The facts are undisputed. On the bulletin board of the mine safety office was a list of miner representatives and alternates dated October 4, 1984 (MSHA Exhibit P-5; Operator's Exhibit R-18). This list has three miner representatives and sixteen alternates. Directly underneath this list on the board was another list dated October 1, 1984 which was the same as the one on the top except that it had only one of the three miner representatives and it had a certification by the one named miner representative that the list had been submitted to MSHA (MSHA Exhibit P-6; Operator's Exhibit R-17). It is agreed that the two additional miner representatives on the top list were proper miner representatives who had submitted the appropriate designation forms to MSHA (MSHA Exhibits P-8 and P-9). The top list was therefore, a composite put together by the operator from the separate forms it had received from its miners which they had sent to MSHA.

The regulation does not specifically address the situation where multiple forms are separately submitted to MSHA and individually given to the operator. I conclude that the list compiled by the operator and placed on the top on the safety office bulletin board, was a sensible, fair and permissible way of handling such a situation. The MSHA inspector admitted he had no quarrel with the accuracy of the top list (Tr. 12). And the company played no part in selecting the representatives. It merely compiled on one piece of paper the separate pieces of paper each of which had been sent to MSHA individually. Its actions were purely ministerial and added nothing of substance. The only alternative would have been for the operator to post separate pieces of paper side by side all over the bulletin board. This would not have aided the process of miner representation. On the contrary, it would have been complicated and confusing. The operator used good judgment and good sense. If MSHA wants the matter handled differently, it can amend the regulation to specify what it wants done. But as matters now stand, the operator must be held to have acted reasonably and efficaciously. Accordingly, I hold the composite list posted on the top in the safety office bulletin board was acceptable.

The next issue is the required posting location for the appropriate list. The regulation requires that the list which must be maintained in a current status be posted on the mine bulletin board. In this case there were three bulletin boards. One, as already discussed was inside the safety office ("A" on MSHA Exhibit P-14). The second board was glassed in and secured on the outside wall of the building which housed the mine office and changing room (Tr. 20-22; 57-59; "B" on MSHA Exhibit P-14). On the door of this building was a sign "Mine Office" and on the top of the board itself was a sign "The Mine Bulletin Board" (Tr. 57). On this bulletin board was posted a list of miner representatives dated September 15, 1980 with some updating notations (Tr. 17, 22, 70, MSHA Exhibit P-7). A comparison with the 1984 list posted...
on top in the safety office reveals that the 1980 list was out of date. The third board was glassed in on the outside of the mill building where the change room for the mill workers was located (Tr. 58, "C" on MSHA Exhibit P-14). The same 1980 list was on this board as on the board on the mine office building (Tr. 23).

I conclude the 1980 list was not current and therefore, not acceptable under the regulations. The question then becomes: was the posting in the safety office sufficient? I conclude it was not. The regulation requires posting on the "mine bulletin board". There was just such a place in this case. The second board ("B") was entitled "Mine Bulletin Board" and was mounted next to a door marked "Mine Office" (Tr. 57). Admittedly, mill employees regularly do not pass by the mine bulletin board but mine employees do so regularly on their way to the changing room which is in the same building (Tr. 58). There is no requirement that every employee pass by the designated location nor is there a requirement for multiple postings. The safety office is where employees would only go for training or if they have dealings with the safety department (Tr. 50). Posting the current list on the safety office bulletin board did not meet the requirements of the regulations. Accordingly, I find the operator violated this aspect of the mandatory standard.

The violation was nonserious. Negligence is low. As already set forth, I find the operator's prior history is good and I accept the stipulations regarding the other criteria.

A penalty of $20 is Assessed.

Cent 85-37-M

Citation No. 2092266

The subject citation dated October 10, 1984, describes the allegedly violative condition or practice as follows:

"The lime slaker area at this time was not kept clean of slick spilled wet lime. An injury was reported on 9/20/84 with the injured employee still off on lost time because of a slip and fall which resulted with a back injury.

An employee, Gilbert A. Romero "helper", stated that this area is cleaned each shift and that at this time when the inspection party arrived, duty called and he was not cleaning at this time."
30 C.F.R. § 55.20-3 provides as follows:

55.20-3 Mandatory. At all mining operations: (a) Workplaces, passageways, storerooms, and service rooms shall be kept clean and orderly. (b) The floor of every workplace shall be maintained in a clean and so far as possible, a dry condition. Where wet processes are used, drainage shall be maintained, and false floors, platforms, mats, or other dry standing places shall be provided where practicable. (c) Every floor, working place, and passageway shall be kept free from protruding nails, splinters, holes, or loose boards, as practicable.

There is no dispute that when the inspector arrived, the floor of the lime slaker area was covered with waste material from the slaker and that the drains were clogged (Tr. 107). The evidence further indicates that in accordance with established procedures the lime slaker helper had intentionally emptied the contents of the slaker chamber onto the floor because the chamber had become plugged (Tr. 151). The helper was supposed to clean up the floor immediately but he had to leave to go to the bathroom (Tr. 110). At this time the inspector arrived and issued the subject citation. MSHA's witness and the operator's witness agreed that the condition which the inspector found could have occurred during the brief interval the helper was gone (Tr. 146, 154). In the absence of evidence on the point, I cannot accept the unsupported suggestion that the helper could have gone to the bathroom before he emptied the slaker chamber (Tr. 147). I appreciate the inspector's concern over the condition he saw. However, a little common sense would not be amiss in a case such as this. Under the circumstances presented I cannot find the operator failed to comply with the mandatory standard.

Citation No. 2092266 is Vacated.

ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the operator is ORDERED TO PAY $20 within 30 days of the date of this decision.

[Signature]
Paul Merlin
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Distribution:

Eve Chesbro, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U. S. Department of Labor, 555 Griffin Square Building, Suite 501, Dallas, TX 75202 (Certified Mail)

Stephen W. Pogson, Esq., Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes, P.C., 2600 North Central Avenue, Phoenix, AZ 85004-3099 (Certified Mail)

/g1
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
333 W. COLFAX AVENUE, SUITE 400
DENVER, COLORADO 80204

FEB 26 1986

FMC WYOMING CORPORATION,
Contestant
v.
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),
Respondent

SECRETARY OF LABOR,
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (MSHA),
Petitioner
v.
FMC WYOMING CORPORATION,
Respondent

CONTEST PROCEEDING
Docket No. WEST 85-4-RM
Citation No. 2084591; 9/17/84

CIVIL PENALTY PROCEEDING
Docket No. WEST 85-41-M
A.C. No. 48-00152-05525
FMC Trona Mine

DECISION

Appearances: James H. Barkley, Esq., and Margaret Miller, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent/Petitioner; John A. Snow, Esq., VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Contestant/Respondent.

Before: Judge Lasher

This matter is complex proceeding filed by FMC Corporation (herein FMC) on October 9, 1984, pursuant to Section 105(d) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. Section 801 et seq., (herein the Act), and a civil penalty proceeding initiated by the Secretary of Labor on February 25, 1985, by the filing of a Proposal for Penalty pursuant to Section 110 of the Act.

A hearing on the record was held in Salt Lake City, Utah, on March 6 and 7, 1985, at which both parties were represented by counsel. The two dockets comprising this proceeding were consolidated for hearing on March 6, 1985 (Tr. 2) since the subject of both is Citation No. 2084591 issued by MSHA Inspector Ronald L. Beason on September 17, 1984, at FMC's trona mine located near Green River, Wyoming. This Citation was issued under Section 104(d)(1) of the Act, and alleges that the violation of the
safety and health standard cited, 30 C.F.R. § 57.20-11 1/ was caused by the "unwarrantable failure" of FMC to comply with such standard.

The violative condition (or practice) was described in the Citation as follows, to wit:

"The old MCC Motor Control room (Baby Sesqui) was insulated with a material which contained chrysotile asbestos. The insulation had deteriorated and had fallen from the roof and portions of the wall. The material was 2-1/2 inches thick and had fallen from the south wall. The lower measures 4 feet x 2-1/2 feet. The upper section which had fallen measured 2 feet x 3 feet. The motor control room measured 9 feet x 12 feet and the insulation had fell from the roof. Loose insulation hanging on railings and electrical conduit measured approximately 2-1/2 inches thick by 2 feet wide by 3 feet long. Another section was approximately 10 x 10 inches. Apparently the roof section and wall sections of insulation had fallen to the floor and had been swept up. Fresh signs of cleaning were apparent. Recently employees had disconnected the electrical switchgear in the room, except three panels for lighting & heating etc.

Asbestos has been determined to be a health hazard and is associated with asbestosis, lung cancer and cancer of the gastrointestinal tract. When suspended fibrous dust particles do not readily settle, but remain suspended for long periods of time, therefore they continue to present an hazard to the employees which worked inside the control room.

On 3-20-1981 the operators records indicated that a sample of the insulation had been taken and found to contain asbestos. The operator failed to barricade the area or post warning signs which displayed the nature of the hazard and the respiratory protection required. Due to the association of asbestos to lung disorders, the obvious work completed in an enclosed room, the unknown contamination, this is an unwarrantable failure of the

1/ This regulation provides:
"Areas where health or safety hazards exist that are not immediately obvious to employees shall be barricaded, or warning signs shall be posted at all approaches. Warning signs shall be readily visible, legible, display the nature of the hazard, and any protective action required."
operator to take the appropriate safety measures to in-
sure that the employees were adequately protected while 
working in this area."

The Secretary initially proposed a penalty of $400.00 for 
the alleged violation but at the hearing and in his post-hearing 
brief urged the maximum penalty authorized in the Act, $10,000.

The Secretary contends that the presence of a potent 
carcinogen, asbestos, in a working environment in and of itself 
is a hazard which requires the mine operator to comply with the 
subject regulation by either barricading or posting warning 
signs.

FMC contends that the Secretary (MSHA) has determined and 
officially advised the mining industry what is a safe or accepted 
level of asbestos by the promulgation of 30 C.F.R. 57.5-1 which 
provides:

§ 57.5 Air quality, ventilation, radiation, and 
physical agents.

Air Quality
General-Surface and Underground

57.5-1 Mandatory. Except as permitted by § 57.5-5: (a) Ex-
cept as provided in paragraph (b), the exposure to airborne 
contaminants shall not excee, on the basis of a time weight-
ed average, the threshold limit values adopted by the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, 
as set forth and explained in the 1973 edition of the Con-
ference's publication, entitled "TLV's Threshold Limit 
Values for Chemical Substances in Workroom Air Adopted by 
ACGIH for 1973," pages 1 through 54, which are hereby in-
corporated by reference and made a part hereof. This publi-
cation may be obtained from the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists by writing to the Secre-
tary-Treasurer, P.O. Box 1937, Cincinnati, Ohio 45201, or 
may be examined in any Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and 
Health District or Subdistrict Office of the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration. Excursions above the listed 
thresholds shall not be of a greater magnitude than is 
characterized as permissible by the Conference. 
(b) The 8-hour time-weighted average airborne concentration 
of asbestos dust to which employees are exposed shall not 
exceed 2 fibers per milliliter greater than 5 microns in 
length, as determined by the membrane filter method at 
400-450 magnification (4 millimeter objective) phase con-
trast illumination. No employees shall be exposed at any
time to airborne concentrations of asbestos fibers in excess
of 10 fibers longer than 5 micrometers, per milliliter of
air, as determined by the membrane filter method over a
minimum sampling time of 15 minutes. "Asbestos" is a generic
term for a number of hydrated silicates that, when crushed
or processed, separate into flexible fibers made up of fib-
rils. Although there are many asbestos minerals, the term
"asbestos" as used herein is limited to the following
minerals: chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, anthophylite
asbestos, tremolite asbestos, and actinolite asbestos.

The subject Citation was issued on September 17, 1984,
during an ongoing regular inspection which was nearing completion.
The alleged violation occurred in an 11' by 12' room called the
"old Motor Control Center" located in the so-called "Baby Sesqui"
complex at the mine. This room is located on the ground floor of
the complex which is approximately five or six floors high (Tr.
120) and at the times material herein it housed the electrical
controls for the complex (Tr. 107). The Baby Sesqui complex
contains part of FMC's milling process (Tr. 99). The room itself
is also known as the "Baby Sesqui control room," "The old MC" and
the "MCC" (Tr. 30). It will be referred to herein as the MCC.

The MCC, as previously noted, is approximately 11 feet by 12
feet and has but one door and no windows (Tr. 30, 116, 171).
There is no ventilation system for the room (Tr. 70). The door
opens from the outside and there is no entry into the Baby Sesqui
from the MCC (Tr. 121, 142). The Baby Sesqui, even though part
of the milling area, is essentially dust free because the
product-trona-is brought in in a liquid state (Tr. 142, 183,
214).

The insulation in the MCC, which was 2-1/2 inches thick (Tr.
50, 57, 58) contained 20% asbestos (Exs. S-12 and S-13; Tr. 25,
40, 48, 61, 66, 240, 265). FMC concedes it was aware of the
asbestos content of the insulation (Tr. 59-62, 63) and that
during a time certain work was performed in 1983/1984 airborne
asbestos fibers would have been present in the MCC (Tr. 345).

Inspector Beason credibly described the pertinent part of
his inspection as follows:

Q. Okay. When you entered the motor control center, what
did you observe?
A. Well, I observed this insulation that was on the walls.
It was deteriorated, fallen down. It was on top of the
control boxes, electrical switches. I went over and looked
at the electrical switches. It was on top of them. There
was a piece off on the right - the south wall - that I took
a piece off and got to fooling with it and talking about it.
Q. It was some kind of insulation, you assumed?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q. What was the texture of this?
A. It was brittle. There was shiny parts in it that - I got it in here; and with my glasses - I've got the cheater glasses - I got up and looked at it. And it looked sort of brittle.

Q. Did you know what that material was at that time?
A. No, ma'am. I asked Mr. Hatt 2/ what it was at that time.

Q. And what did Mr. Hatt tell you?
A. He refused to answer me.

Q. How did you find out what that material was?
A. Well, I went to him several times. I had it, and I went to him several times and asked him what it was. And he refused to answer. I asked him if I could get a sample of the material. He said that I could. And I went next door to another place there and asked him if I could take a bottle. And he said yes. And I put it in. And I asked him was that asbestos, at that time I asked him. And he said he wouldn't tell me, I'd have to talk to the environmentalist.

Q. Who is the environmentalist?
A. I've got his -

Q. Could that be Mr. Watson?

THE WITNESS: Carl Watson 3/

(Tr. 31-33)

"Q. Did you ever see the results of the material sample which you put in the bottle and turned in?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that this Exhibit 12?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And does it indicate on there what the material was?
A. Yes, sir.

2/ Bud Hatt, FMC safety supervisor.
3/ Carl L. Watson, Environmental/Safety Engineer (Tr. 227).
Q. What was it?
A. Twenty percent asbestos." (Tr. 40).

The sample of insulation material taken was representative of the insulation found around the MCC (Tr. 31, 41-43), which had fallen from the walls and roof of the room (Tr. 44, 56) and was observed (1) on top of a conduit, control boxes, electrical switches, (2) hanging from the rafters (Tr. 31, 43-45), (3) on the handles of a control panel (Tr. 45), (4) inside the control panel (Tr. 48), and (5) on the floor mats and other areas (Tr. 52). This insulation material was deteriorating and falling down from the walls and roof (Tr. 31, 58, 44).

The record in this case provides adequate information as to the general characteristics and hazardous nature of asbestos. Asbestos is the generic name for a number of hydrated silicates (Tr. 244). Chrysotile is one such silicate (Tr. 244, 30 C.F.R. § 57.5). Asbestos is composed of fibers which are bundled together to form larger fibers which in turn are bundled together to form still larger fibers (Tr. 245). The result is that as asbestos is broken down it does not break down into pieces but rather as each fiber is broken down it releases many more fibers which in turn, if broken down, release still more fibers (Tr. 245). Asbestos fibers 5 microns or larger in size are clearly hazardous (Tr. 247, 30 C.F.R. § 57.5-1). Five microns is approximately one-tenth the size of a particle visible to the unaided eye (Tr. 247). A visible cloud of airborne asbestos contains harmful fibers that are invisible (Tr. 246-249) and will take approximately 30 minutes to fall one-foot in perfectly still air and longer if there is any air current present. Such a fiber can become airborne simply by the air currents created by a person walking (Tr. 247-248). Asbestos can be liberated and suspended in the air easily and by slight movement, such as a person walking by it (Tr. 67).

Richard L. Durand, an MSHA District Industrial Hygienist, testified concerning the invisible (non-obvious) nature of asbestos:

"Q. If you can see a cloud of dust of asbestos, is it possible to have more asbestos that you can't see that is suspended in the air?
A. Definitely. You'll have a range of dust particles from that you can't see on up to very large particles. You have a whole gamut of sizes.

Q. And would those particles that you can't see present a health hazard?
A. Yes, even above five microns, what the standard is based on. So from five to fifty are particles that you can't see. And they will definitely pose a health hazard." (Tr. 249).
Various diseases can result from inhalation of asbestos. One disease, asbestosis, is directly related to the amount of asbestos inhaled. The disease can be contracted whether the amount of asbestos is inhaled over a short period or over a long period of time. It results when fibers are inhaled directly into the lungs. As the fibers are retained by the lungs they are coated with cells rich in iron called "asbestos bodies" discernible by x-ray. The symptoms therefrom may appear from 4 to 15 years after exposure. Such symptoms are shortness of breath, coughing, tightening of the chest, difficulty in breathing and a hampering of the lungs to exchange oxygen. Death can occur 10 to 15 years after the onset of symptoms (Tr. 250, 251).

A second disease resulting from asbestos inhalation is bronchi carcinoma or bronchial cancer. Asbestos, when inhaled into the bronchial area, can lead to the development of cancer.

Mesothelioma is a cancer of the lining of the lung. It is a non-treatable, non-operable and always fatal disease. Death generally results in less than one year after the onset of symptoms (Tr. 253). This disease can result from the inhalation of a single fiber. As little as one occupational exposure to asbestos can cause this cancer (Tr. 254). It is estimated that 7% to 10% of those who work with asbestos develop this disease (Tr. 254).

Cancer of the esophagus, stomach and colon can also be caused by asbestos. These cancers are generally brought about by coughing up sputum containing asbestos which is swallowed, thereby transmitting the asbestos fibers to the esophagus, stomach and colon (Tr. 254).

FMC's Environmental Safety Engineer, Watson, unequivocally admitted on the record that asbestos is a "hazardous material" having the potential to cause death (Tr. 309, 311, 312), that it is a known health hazard (Tr. 312) and that FMC did not either barricade the MCC or post warning signs as required by § 57.20-11 (Tr. 114, 237, 296, 313).

Substantial evidence in the record establishes that FMC became aware that the insulation in the MCC contained asbestos in March, 1983, when Mr. Watson removed a piece of the material and forwarded it to FMC's laboratory in Princeton, New Jersey for analysis with the notation to "Please Rush" on the forwarding form. Watson said that he sent the sample to the laboratory at the request of an unidentified employee and that he did not know who made the "Please Rush" notation on the form. Watson also denied writing on the form the statement "Suspected asbestos insulation." (Ex. S-13; Tr. 229-232).

FMC's analysis of the insulation material from the MCC (dated 3/27/81) indicates that the material "contains chrysotile, an asbestos mineral and calcium carbonate, probably a binder.
These components were determined by X-ray diffraction procedure." (Ex. S-13, Tr. 237). 4/ FMC failed thereafter to definitely determine if the calcium carbonate was a binder (Tr. 317).

The Secretary established that a significant number of FMC miners without prior notice or warning were exposed to the hazardous conditions prevalent in the MCC. Thus, for periods ranging from two to three weeks to four months in the latter part of 1983 and early 1984, at least four FMC miners, who were engaged in the performance of various and sundry duties and functions, worked in the MCC where they were engaged in the removal of the control center located there to another location (Tr. 107, 108, 150-157, 170-193, 199-219). The actions of those employees, particularly in taking down the insulation material from the walls and ceiling, created airborne dust composed of particles of the insulation taken down (Tr. 115-119, 153-158, 166, 206, 208). The record does not indicate that FMC ever sampled the composition of the air during this period. Since the material itself was composed of 20% asbestos I find therefrom and from expert opinion of record - that at least a proportionate part of the airborne dust was composed of asbestos particles in sufficient quantity to (1) be subject to inhalation and (2) be hazardous. (Tr. 111, 193, 249, 255-259, 260, 266, 277-282, 290, 345).

It is also found that the "dust" described by the workmen was not attributable to the welding or use of a cutting board (Tr. 285). Thus, the four workmen in question testified that in the process of their work they "tore" insulation from the walls, pulled it from the ceiling, threw the insulation to the floor, swept it up, emptied it, and traumatized it in various ways which resulted in dust so heavy their visibility was impaired at times beyond 4 or 5 feet (Tr. 111-119, 153-157, 166, 173-177, 199-208).

While there was evidence that the dust got into their mouths, eyes and noses, there was no probative or reliable evidence that the coughing and other symptoms described by them was attributable to inhalation or other ingestion of asbestos fibers (Tr. 282, 349). Such evidence might have been obtainable through sputum analysis or other forms of testing at the time. Even though it is a fair inference that such evidence was not

4/ In addition to analyses of the "bulk" samples taken by Inspector Beason and Mr. Watson referred to above, a third set of laboratory analyses of samples taken from the MCC was made part of the evidence in this matter. Thus, in September 1984, FMC took samples of the air (Exs. R-3, 4, 5 and 6; Tr. 267, 268, 300). I find that these analyses have little probative value since no one was working in the area at the time the samples were gathered (Tr. 267, 268, 321, 322). Even so, these samples did show there was some airborne asbestos present in the MCC (Tr. 268).
secured because of the failure of FMC to notify those imperiled of the conditions prevalent in the MCC, no adverse inference is taken in the absence of more specific evidence. That is, it is not inferred that the physical symptoms expressed were caused in whole or in part by the presence of airborne asbestos in the atmosphere.

In addition to the employees engaged in the special project of removing the controls from the MCC in 1983-1984, the Secretary also showed that various other employees, such as maintenance men and electricians, routinely went in and out of the MCC and worked there without benefit of respirators or warning (Tr. 99-103, 149, 333-335).

As previously noted, FMC contends that no violation can be established absent a showing of the presence of exposure to airborne contaminants at the levels provided in 30 C.F.R. § 57.5-1. From the standpoint of the obligations imposed on the mine operator by the two regulations respectively relied on by the parties, it is first noted that testing the MCC in a passive state for its airborne asbestos level might not have revealed a level in violation of § 57.5-1. A violative level of airborne asbestos might not have manifested itself until miners actually worked in the area. The record in this case well documents the different types of work activities which did result in raising dust from asbestos-constituted insulation into the air.

Section 57.5-1 is specific. It relates to exposure to airborne contaminants, in this case, asbestos. It presumes testing— which FMC in any event apparently did not perform— for a protracted period and with some regularity: "The 8-hours time-weighted average airborne concentration of asbestos dust to which employees are exposed shall not exceed 2 fibers per milliliter greater than 5 microns in length, etc." MSHA did not establish, nor did it seek to, the presence of airborne concentrations of asbestos dust in the quantity, fiber lengths, and sampling time durations required to establish a violation of 30 C.F.R. § 57.5 (Tr. 19-26, 71-77, 78, 79; Exs. S-12 and S-13). See Secretary v. Tannsco, Inc., & Harold Schmarje, 7 FMSHRC 2006, 2009 (1985).

On the other hand, the regulation the Secretary charges was infringed, § 57.20-11, is less specific in delineating the factors or environment which must be present to trigger the standard's coverage. It requires simply that (1) a "health or safety hazard" must exist which (2) is not "immediately obvious". From the mine operator's standpoint, § 57.20-11 requires barricades or posting of warning signs telling of the nature of the hazard and protective action required. Section 57.5-1 makes it a violation to permit miner exposure to a specified level of asbestos and it mandates testing to ascertain if this level has been achieved. Can a mine operator by not testing when employees work in an area where there is asbestos present (as FMC failed to
do in this case) evade responsibility for exposing its employees to asbestos, the hazardous nature of which is well-established in this record? Both logic and evidence of record suggest the conclusion that the airborne level of asbestos fluctuates with the activities and movement of miners and the nature of the chores they are performing. Adopting FMC's argument that the protections provided in § 57.20-11 are not operable until the Secretary first tests and determines that the airborne asbestos concentration level equates with the level provided in § 57.5-1 would leave miners unprotected—as they were in the instant case—and most emphatically where an operator directs them to work in an area it knows contains asbestos but does no testing while they are there. Hence, FMC's miners, were not aware of the presence of asbestos in the insulation material, and thus had no opportunity to take precautions to alleviate the threat posed to them, such as (1) by limiting their movement and activities, (2) by handling the material more cautiously and gently, (3) by refusing to perform certain work unless ongoing testing is conducted, (4) by altering their techniques and methods, (5) by wearing suitable, effective respirators, or (6) by reporting the situation to interested authority such as MSHA, their union, and/or the mine operator's safety personnel.

Analysis of the record and happenings in this matter readily demonstrates the differences in the purposes of and protections provided by the two regulations and the reasons for not grafting one on the other. There is no indication in the Act or the regulations themselves that the two regulations should be read together as FMC urges. Section 57.20-11 does not cross-reference § 57.5-1. It provides a different, separate, and independent measure of protection for miners. It is not dependent on the mine operator's diligent, good faith sampling of the air in the working environment. The position advanced by FMC is found to lack merit.

Based on the preponderant evidence, and admissions of record, it is concluded that a hazardous condition prevailed in the MCC during the period in question, that such health hazard was not immediately obvious to numerous employees who worked there, and that neither barricades or appropriate warning signs were posted at any time by FMC at any approach to the MCC. A violation of 30 C.F.R. § 57.20-11 is thus found to have occurred.

FMC also challenges the special findings required under Section 104(d), that is the so-called "unwarrantable failure" and "significant and substantial" findings. It is first noted the insidious potential of asbestos to cause some of mankind's most fearsome diseases is well-documented in this record. 5/ It is

5/ See also Disability Compensation for Asbestos-Associated Disease in the United States, Irving J. Selikoff, M.D., (Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, undated), a collection of leading studies on the subject published in approximately 1981.
equally clear, and I have hereinabove found, that the mine operator's Environmental Safety Engineer, Carl L. Watson, and other high level management personnel were aware that the MCC's wall and ceiling insulation contained asbestos as early as March, 1981, when a bulk sample was sent for laboratory analysis. I conclude from the urgency surrounding the taking of this sample, the prompt notification to higher management of the results of the laboratory analysis and the testimony of Mr. Watson as to the high potential for serious disease that asbestos exposure carries, that FMC was acutely aware of the hazard posed by non-compliance with 30 C.F.R. § 57.20-11. Indeed, the circumstances and hazard addressed by § 57.20-11 actually came to fruition in the 1983-1984 period when several employees were engaged in the removal of the control center inside the MCC without benefit of the various protections previously listed. These evidentiary considerations coincide with the requirement of section 104(d) of the Act that the violation must be "caused by the unwarrantable failure of (the) operator to comply" with the pertinent mandatory safety or health standard. The Commission in numerous cases has tacitly approved and has not changed the long-standing definition of unwarrantable failure found in Zeigler Coal Company, 7 IBMA 280 (1977) which was decided under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969:

"In light of the foregoing, we hold that an inspector should find that a violation of any mandatory standard was caused by an unwarrantable failure to comply with such standard if he determines that the operator involved has failed to abate the conditions or practices constituting such violation, conditions or practices the operator knew or should have known existed or which it failed to abate because of a lack of due diligence, or because of indifference or lack of reasonable care."

The record indicates also that FMC was aware that other employees were working in the area routinely (Tr. 296, 333-335) and that those employees who were working in the MCC to remove the control center were suffering substantial symptoms (Tr. 193, 234) even though this record does not permit any determination that such were wholly or partly related to asbestos exposure. Nevertheless, no further testing on the material was conducted by FMC to determine if the asbestos was adequately contained in binding material after March 1981, (Ex. S-13; Tr. 317, 329), nor does it appear that FMC tested the air during the removal of the control center in 1983/1984.

It is concluded that FMC was grossly negligent in allowing the MCC to remain unposted, if not barricaded, in the above circumstances and in view of the latent threat posed by the presence of asbestos in such significant quantity in the walls and ceiling of the MCC. Such high degree of negligence surpasses the Zeigler culpability concepts of "lack of due diligence", "indifference" and "lack of reasonable care," and clearly meets the "unwarrantable failure" requirement of section 104(d).
The question remains whether the subject section 104(d)(1) Citation cited a violation which was "of such nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a ... mine safety or health hazard" as that phrase is used in the Act.

Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act provides:

If, upon any inspection of a coal or other mine, an authorized representative of the Secretary finds that there has been a violation of any mandatory health or safety standard, and if he also finds that, while the conditions created by such violation do not cause imminent danger, such violation is of such nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal or other mine safety or health hazard, and if he finds such violation to be caused by an unwarrantable failure of such operator to comply with such mandatory health or safety standards, he shall include such finding in any citation given to the operator under this Act....


The Commission first interpreted this statutory language in

Cement Division, National Gypsum Co., 3 FMSHRC 822 (April 1981), holding:

...[A] violation is of such a nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a mine safety or health hazard if, based on the particular facts surrounding the violation, there exists a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an injury or illness of a reasonably serious nature.

3 FMSHRC at 825 (emphasis added). In Mathies Coal Company, 6 FMSHRC 1 (January 1984), the Commission reaffirmed the analytical approach set forth in National Gypsum, and stated:

In order to establish that a violation of a mandatory safety standard is significant and substantial under National Gypsum, the Secretary of Labor must prove: (1) the underlying violation of a mandatory safety standard; (2) a discrete safety hazard -- that is, a measure of danger to safety -- contributed to by the violation; (3)

6/ Herein "S & S".
reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an injury; and (4) a reasonable likelihood that the injury in question will be of a reasonably serious nature.

6 FMSHRC at 3-4 (footnote omitted). Accord Consolidation Coal Company, 6 FMSHRC 189, 193 (February 1984).

As to the four elements set forth in Mathies, the Commission, in Secretary v. U.S. Steel Mining Corp., 6 FMSHRC 1834 (1984), noted that the reference to "hazard" in the second element was simply a recognition that the violation must be more than a mere technical violation -- i.e., that the violation present a measure of danger. See National Gypsum, supra, 3 FMSHRC at 827. It also noted that the reference to "hazard" in the third element in Mathies contemplates the possibility of a subsequent event. This requires that the Secretary establish a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to will result in an event in which there is an injury. The fourth element in Mathies requires that the potential injury be of a reasonably serious nature. Finally, in U.S. Steel Mining Co., Inc., 6 FMSHRC 1573, 1574 (1984), (1984), the Commission reemphasized its holding in National Gypsum that the contribution of the violation to the cause and effect of a mine safety hazard is what must be significant and substantial.

The record reveals that from the middle of 1981 at least through early 1984, FMC employees worked routinely in the MCC, an asbestos-laden, unventilated room, and for the latter part of this period other employees were required to work there while removing controls. This latter group, four of whom testified in this proceeding, in ignorance of the risk and the need for care, removed the asbestos insulation without caution, thus placing their health in considerable jeopardy.

Mr. Watson's own description of the risk posed by asbestos exposure is incisive:

"Q. Do you recognize any danger in exposure to asbestos?  
A. Sure.

Q. I mean, do you personally believe that is is a hazardous industrial material?  
A. Sure.

Q. Do you believe that it has the potential to cause death?  
A. Yeah, I believe that."  
(Tr. 308, 309, 312).
It has previously been concluded that a violation of the safety standard occurred. In no sense, was this a technical violation. Here, the mine operator apparently performed no testing of the air in the working environment during the removal of the control center. This eliminated the possibility of any determination of the asbestos fiber levels in the MCC when work was being performed there. By not posting the area with warning signs, FMC deprived the workmen of the opportunity to evaluate the danger and take various steps to protect themselves—a remedy not directly afforded by 30 C.F.R. § 57.5-1. Such failure clearly contributed a considerable measure of danger to their safety.

In the absence of any affirmative measures by FMC to prevent its miners' exposure to the asbestos hazard found to have existed in the MCC, their resultant contraction of various asbestos-related diseases remains a reasonable possibility for many years to come.

The factual findings heretofore made concerning the nature of asbestos, the ease with which it becomes airborne, the conditions prevalent in the MCC working environment, the exposure of uninformed miners, the various health problems which can result from such exposure, the percentage of exposed workers who contract such, and the lengthy period they will remain in jeopardy after such exposure, mandate the conclusion that there was—and is—a reasonable likelihood that the hazard contributed to by the violation will result in a serious injury in the form of a disease. Lastly, there is little doubt on this record that any disease so resulting would be of a reasonably serious nature in view of FMC's admissions that such could result in death. Accordingly, it is concluded that this was a "significant and substantial" violation.

The prerequisite special findings of the 104(d)(1) Citation herein are found to have substantial support in the record.

A violation having been found in this consolidated contest/penalty proceeding, assessment of a civil penalty is required. The parties have stipulated that FMC had an "average" history of previous violations, presumably in the customary 2-year period preceding the occurrence of the violation (Tr. 293). The parties also stipulated on the record that FMC is a large mine operator, that it proceeded in good faith to achieve rapid compliance after notification of the violation, and that any penalty amount would not jeopardize FMC's ability to continue in business. Section 110(i) of the Act requires evaluation of two additional, and critical, penalty assessment criteria— the seriousness of the violation and the negligence of the mine operator in the commission thereof. I have previously determined that FMC was grossly negligent in the commission of this violation and that the same was of a high degree of seriousness in view of the tragic, possibly fatal diseases which can result therefrom. The workmen exposed will live in the shadow of asbestos-related disease for many years to come. In view of these latter two
determinations and the size of the operator, there is little to mitigate the amount of the penalty warranted. It is concluded that a penalty of $2,500.00 is appropriate under the circumstances.

ORDER

1. Citation No. 2084591 is affirmed in all respects.

2. Respondent FMC shall pay the Secretary of Labor the sum of $2,500.00 as and for a civil penalty within 30 days from the date of issuance of this decision.

Michael A. Lasher, Jr.
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

John A. Snow, Esq., and James A. Holtkamp, Esq., VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 50 S. Main Street, Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, UT 84144 (Certified Mail)

Margaret Miller, Esq., and James H. Barkley, Esq., Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, 1585 Federal Building, 1961 Stout Street, Denver, CO 80294 (Certified Mail)
Complainant Harold J. Atkins, (Atkins), brings this action on his own behalf alleging he was discriminated against by his employer, Cyprus Mines Corporation, (Cyprus), in violation of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., (the Act).

Section 105(c) of the Act, provides in part, as follows:

No person shall discharge or in any other manner discriminate against ... or otherwise interfere with the exercise of the statutory rights of any miner ... because such miner ... has filed or made a complaint under or relating to this Act, including a complaint notifying the operator or the operator's agent, or the representative of the miners ... of an alleged danger or safety or health violation ... or because such miner ... has instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or because of the exercise by such miner ... on behalf of himself or others of any statutory right afforded by this Act.

After notice to the parties, a hearing on the merits took place in Reno, Nevada on June 19, 1985.

The parties filed post-trial briefs.
Issues

The issues are whether complainant was discriminated against by respondent in violation of the Act. If such discrimination occurred, then what damages should be awarded.

Summary of the Evidence

Complainant's Evidence

Harold J. Atkins, 43 years of age and inexperienced in mining, was hired by Cyprus on July 9, 1981. His initial duties included utility work and cleaning the leach pads. His activities also involved work in the ADR \(^1\) unit where the utility crew helped mix cyanide and haul water. The water, dumped into a preholding tank, feeds the boiler (Tr. 34-37, 41).

After three months Atkins transferred to the pit as a grater operator where he remained about 2 1/2 to 3 months (Tr. 37).

About October 1, 1981, because of higher pay, Atkins transferred to the ADR plant as an operator (Tr. 38). He had no previous experience and the foreman trained him to run the mill (Tr. 39). The work process in the ADR was described as follows: material containing gold and precious metals enters a preg pond from the leach pads. The material then goes into the ADS circuit. Solution is filtered through and captured in the carbon (Tr. 39).

After a time the material is moved into a preheat holding tank and later transferred to a strip tank. The solution is then heated by a boiler and it then goes to electrowind where the gold is removed (Tr. 40). The procedures include stripping, reclaiming and preheating. The stripping process was almost continuous (Tr. 40, 42).

After two or three weeks in the ADR plant Atkins experienced a "nuisance" from the ammonia released in the stripping process. He had headaches; in addition, his nose was dry and bothering him. Since he felt the condition was minor he did not see a doctor at that time (Tr. 41, 42).

Atkins was elected to the mine safety committee and attended his first meeting in February 1982. The Committee discussed first aid, inadequate ventilation and communications in event of emergencies. When Atkins applied for the foreman's position he was told he could not remain as a member of the committee if he received the promotion (Tr. 42-44, 48).

\(^1\) ADR: an acronym for absorption, deabsorption and refining (Tr. 254).
Atkins first became concerned about mercury because of workers Eagle, Legace and Bowers. Worker Eagle pointed out that the mercury (which could be seen) was accumulating in ADR tank No. 1. Legace spoke to Atkins about his dizziness and other problems which he related to the ADR work (Tr. 44, 45, 235).

Atkins thought Legace's physical problems and symptoms might be relevant to a worker in the ADR because of the carbon, the open tanks and the refining process (Tr. 46, 47). Atkins thought he was also exposed to mercury. Legace said it should be checked out. He further recommended that Atkins and anyone else in the ADR contact a doctor. This was the reason Atkins sought medical attention (Tr. 47).

Sometime in April, about the time of the discussions with Legace, Atkins thought he had a physical problem. The buildup of the ammonia was progressing to a point where he knew he should have his sinuses checked. His nose was dry all of the time and he was having breathing problems. Additional symptoms included headaches, dizziness and blurred vision. Neither food nor coffee tasted right (Tr. 49-51).

Most of the time during his stay in the ADR, Atkins' main problem and concern was exposure to ammonia fumes (Tr. 120; Ex. R23, pg. 2). MSHA did not issue any citations for excessive levels of ammonia (Tr. 121).

Atkins visited Dr. Horgan on April 24, 1982. A quantitative test for mercury showed a level of 65. Industrial guidelines indicate an acceptable level is under 150. A toxic level is above 150. Atkins wasn't satisfied with the doctor's answers (Tr. 193-196; Ex. R5).

On April 29, 1982, Atkins had a quantitative test from Dr. Andrews. The doctor stated that 65 was high and he indicated the State level was 150 milligrams. Atkins knew Legace was experiencing problems with a level of 86 or 87 (Tr. 49-53).

Atkins was the day foreman when MSHA inspector Frank B. Seale came on the premises on May 4, 1982. A 3M tag was used to test for mercury. There were no fans and the inspector, according to Atkins, was "staggered" at some of the readings (Tr. 60, 61, 221).

Atkins was not aware of the later MSHA visit on June 14. But in the interim Cyprus had taken corrective measures: these included warning signs, fume surveys, mercury testing and respirators (Tr. 223, 224, 318).

Within two or four days of the violation Atkins stopped at Seale's office to talk about the testing equipment. He was also interested in seeing the MSHA books. Seale gave Atkins copies of
the Cyprus citation (Tr. 61-63). The citations had not been posted in the mine (Tr. 63). Atkins later received a full documentation from the MSHA Arizona office (Tr. 64).

There was probably more concern in the plant for ammonia than for mercury. There was no ventilation and you could feel the ammonia instantly (Tr. 64, 65).

After the MSHA inspection the company took care of the problem to a large degree (Tr. 65).

On June 9, 1982, Atkins visited Dr. Andrews, a pulmonologist. Complaints to Andrews included chemicals, ammonia, cyanide fumes and exposures to mercury. Complete blood and urine tests failed to confirm mercury poisoning. The blood mercury level was identified as less than 1. The reference range is less than 2.6; the level is potentially toxic if it is over 2.6 (Tr. 202-204; Ex. Rl4).

On June 10, 1982, Dr. Givens, a company doctor, gave Atkins a general physical examination. The symptoms exhibited by Atkins, which all occurred about June 10, included nausea, colitis and split vision. The doctor was more interested in writing than in listening so Atkins did not tell him all of his symptoms (Tr. 54, 69, 70). Atkins showed Dr. Givens the quantitative test. He stated that things were "alright" (Tr. 55). Dr. Givens also told Atkins that his health was generally excellent. Dr. Givens did not comment on the symptoms (Tr. 55).

On June 29, 1982, Atkins saw Dr. Badshah, his family physician, to whom he also showed the quantitative test. Dr. Badshah diagnosed Atkins' condition as colon colitis. He also had a lower and upper G.I. performed as well as a rectal examination. The blood tests forwarded to Dr. Badshah by Dr. Andrews were normal (Tr. 55-58, 65, 215).

Atkins was concerned about his health and he mentioned to superintendent Leveaux that he would like to temporarily leave the ADR because of his health. Leveaux said management would need a doctor's statement to that effect (Tr. 65-67, 238). Atkins believed that the severity of the colon problem was worsening, and the condition was playing on his nerves. Atkins felt the ADR was unsafe for him because his medical problems started there and they were not clearing up. He was having split vision, mostly in the right eye. This occurred four times in a 30 day span just after he started going to Dr. Badshah (Tr. 68, 69, 242). Badshah had suggested Atkins contact Dr. Schonders, an ophthalmologist. The specialist, in turn, suggested that Atkins go to the University because the problem was complicated (Tr. 69, 213). Dr. Schonders, as well as Doctors Horgan, Andrews and Givens failed to confirm mercury poisoning. But Dr. Badshah said it was possible (Tr. 214, 220).
Atkins returned to Dr. Badshah on July 9, 1982, where he related the same symptoms; namely, exposure to chemicals including ammonia, cyanide and fear of mercury exposure. Dr. Badshah gave Atkins a note which stated:

To whom it may concern: Jim Leveaux. This patient is having cramping, abdominal pains, nausea. On exam there is marked spasticity of the colon. He is advised to avoid exposure to chemicals which are likely to aggravate this condition. (Tr. 71, 72, 215, 216; Ex. R23).

Leveaux looked at the doctor's note and stated it would be necessary to talk to Appelberg, the Cyprus personnel manager (Tr. 73, 74). Appelberg told Atkins he would transfer him to utility but cut his pay. In the ensuing discussion Atkins claimed this was a medical situation and his miner's rights guaranteed that he keep his foreman's pay in the utility job. Appelberg agreed to the transfer (Tr. 73-79). Atkins went to utility thinking he would retain his foreman's pay (Tr. 126-127).

The next day Appelberg told him his pay was cut. He could either go back into ADR, leave the property, or be fired. Rather than be fired Atkins returned to the ADR. Atkins also stated he returned to utility the next day (Tr. 73-79).

One day before he was terminated Atkins explained the ultimatum and medical situation to MSHA inspector Frank Seale at the MSHA office. The next day (July 15) Atkins was told to work in the ADR or be fired (Tr. 78-81).

Before July 15th, between the two MSHA inspections, Atkins had told management that it was unsafe to work in the ADR. On the day he was terminated he did not say it was unsafe because he was more concerned about getting a note from the doctor than in closing down the ADR (Tr. 243).

Atkins also told Appelberg that he needed to get out of the ADR. It was unsafe for him (Tr. 238).

Atkins confirmed the contents of the typewritten note given to him by Appelberg when he was terminated and as well as his handwritten reply requesting an additional examination by a company doctor before he would return to the ADR (Tr. 112, 117, 118, 119; Ex. C21, R24).

Atkins was fired on July 15 as he refused to work in the ADR. The evidence contains a two page medical report, dated July 16, 1982, from Dr. Nur Badshah. The report states, in part, as follows:

**IMPRESSIONS:**

1. Loss of central vision of right eye, due to optic neuritis of the right eye, etiology most probably toxic neuritis due to metallic poisoning.
2. Occult lower GI bleeding, probably due to gastroenteropathy related to metallic poisoning.


So far, I have not received the copies of the report from the pulmonologist. I recommend that patient needs to be further evaluated by a neurologist, because metallic poisoning can cause nervous system changes affecting especially the cerebellar system. This should be thoroughly evaluated by a neurologist. I also recommend that the patient should be thoroughly evaluated by a gastroenterologist for his gastrointestinal symptoms. Until he is further evaluated by a neurologist and gastroenterologist, patient is advised to avoid contact with chemicals and he has been given a note to that effect on 7-9-82. (Exhibit Cl4).

Atkins believed he suffered mercury poisoning in 1982. His quantitative test was 65. He could not state whether the ADR was a safe place to work in July 1982. When he discussed termination with Appelberg on July 15, 1982, he may not have claimed that it was unsafe to work in the ADR. But at the time of that discussion he believed the levels were close to acceptable and it could have been perfectly safe in the ADR (Tr. 109). Atkins would go back in the ADR today (Tr. 109-110). Further, he would have gone back if there hadn't been a problem (Tr. 124).

Before Atkins moved from Round Mountain he would have accepted a job in the ADR if it had been offered to him. He would not have gone back to work in the ADR in August or September 1982 because of a possible NIC medical evaluation (Tr. 99-100).

Atkins last hourly wage at Cyprus was $10.35 or $11.47 as the ADR foreman. If he had not been fired he would have earned $36,000. After being laid off in two months, Atkins found employment with Ray Dickinson earning $5 an hour. He worked there two and one-half months (Tr. 80-85). He was also employed at Teague Motor Company in 1984 earning $800 per month. In addition, he had a county job for three months earning $800. After the county job Atkins received unemployment compensation. He has not worked since that time except about eight months ago he occasionally played in a band on weekends. This part-time work pays $80 a weekend (Tr. 80-85, 94, 97, 98; Ex. C21, C27, C28). Atkins "guesses" that he has earned $300 playing in the band since he was terminated by Cyprus (Tr. 94).

The 1040 U.S. income tax returns for 1981 and 1982 show, respectively, wages of $12,924 and $15,639 (Tr. 89; Ex. C25, C26).
Atkins' trailer had been gutted before he acquired it in 1972 or 1973. At that time he paid $4,000 for it. He fixed it and estimated its value at $8,000. He sold it for $4,000 because there was pressure on him to leave the company property (Tr. 87, 93, 94).

After he sold the trailer Atkins moved back to Oregon three and one-half months after he was terminated. There were two trips involved which cost him $800 to $900 for trailer rentals (Tr. 88, 109-110).

Atkins acknowledges that he received a written notice of having had eight absences in the previous twelve months (Tr. 114; Ex. R22).

Mrs. Atkins testified that her husband's health problems began in 1982. He complained and became irritable. Additional symptoms were mostly abdominal cramping and nasal headaches. She related his ill health to conditions in the mine because he had been in good health before working there (Tr. 250-252).

Respondent's Evidence

William Hamby, James Appelberg, Frank Seale and Sharon Badger testified for Cyprus.

William Hamby, the plant superintendent and metallurgist, indicated that Cyprus was closing down its operation in September 1985. He did not expect to be employed at the end of 1985 (Tr. 253, 254, 296, 297).

Hamby and Atkins were in daily contact when Atkins began working as an operator in the ADR in October 1981. Atkins had successfully bid on the operator's job. As an ADR operator Atkins' duties included monitoring the pump, reagent mixing, and reagent determinations for strength, advancing carbon and mixing it (Tr. 256-261).

In February 1982, Cyprus learned of mercury problems in the ADR. The mercury, which came as a surprise to Cyprus, was detected by monitoring with a 3M 3600 Model badge type dosimeter (Tr. 265, 266).

In March 1982 Cyprus ordered and installed a 98,000 C.F.M. fan in the ADR (Tr. 296).

When Atkins became safety representative he voiced his concerns about the plant environment, the mercury and the quality of the air. He also complained about ammonia (Tr. 261). There were four leaky pipes about the plant but, for the most part, ammonia in the atmosphere occurred when an operator would leave a hatch open. That would be the major source of the ammonia smell.
(Tr. 262). When Atkins complained about the ammonia Hamby instructed them to keep it out of the atmosphere (Tr. 262). Prior to March 1982 Cyprus was not certain what was "going on" in relation to the possibility of mercury being in the plant (Tr. 262).

Hamby wasn't sure of the circumstances but Atkins told him that he believed it was unsafe or hazardous to work in the ADR (Tr. 262-263).

In April 1982 Atkins was promoted to working foreman. The position opened because Cyprus went to full production. Hamby, Leveaux and three other working foremen thought he was best qualified for the position (Tr. 263). Because of the direct line between management and foreman it was suggested to Atkins that he might want to relinquish his duties as safety representative (Tr. 264).

Hamby denies that he ever threatened Atkins' job. Once he told him he was shooting his mouth off. In a handwritten note, dated April 23, 1982, he recorded that he told Atkins to keep his opinions to himself about possible contamination by mercury. Further, some of the people were complaining that he didn't know what he was talking about and it was upsetting them. Atkins replied that he would "cool it" (Tr. 282, 283; Ex. R4).

On April 27 Hamby, in a letter to plant personnel, sought to bring all employees together with the plant hygienist and company doctor to discuss mercury (Tr. 269; Ex. R7).

The company considered mercury to be a problem because of the hazards associated with it. Before May 4 the company had taken steps to discover the source of the mercury levels by using a Bacharach MB-2 sniffer. On May 4, 1982, the new equipment was not operating properly. It had been inoperative for a week (Tr. 267-269).

On May 4 MSHA inspector Frank B. Seale inspected the ADR. On that day he issued five citations. They allege Cyprus failed to post warning signs concerning health hazards in the ADR; atmospheric concentrations of mercury vapor exceeded the excursion limit for an eight hour TWA coupled with a failure to use respiratory protection; failure to conduct fume surveys; failure to use shielding during arc welding and failure to guard a chain sprocket. The foregoing citations were subsequently abated by Cyprus (Tr. 171-179; Ex. R9).

On the day of the inspection 3M badges were placed on employees Herrera, White and Atkins. The 3M badges were analyzed. The analysis indicated the three refinery workers had been exposed to mercury fumes. The TWA rates for Herrera, White and Atkins were, respectively, .081, .084 and .168 (Mg/M3). Atkins'
dosimeter badge was 3.36 times the TLV. Further, it was twice the TLV of the other two employees. Citation No. 2008502 was issued by inspector Seale on July 20, 1982, for the exposure to the mercury fumes to Herrera, White and Atkins that occurred on May 4, 1982 (Tr. 171, 172, 189, 190; Ex. R9). The delay of over three months was caused in part by the time required to analyze the exposure (Tr. 171, 172, 189, 190; Ex. R9). On August 10, 1982, Citation 2008502 was terminated when it was found that the TLV for mercury complied with the standard (Tr. 184; Ex. R27).

Witness Seale also testified generally concerning the meaning of the TLV and TWA for mercury (Tr. 164-167; Ex. R6).

Hamby and Atkins discussed the TLV's. Atkins was always trying to convert the TLV's to parts per million. But there is no relationship between the two (Tr. 282).

After the MSHA inspection Cyprus continued to test for mercury by using 3M badges, sniffer equipment, as well as urine and blood sampling. Hamby discussed rules and practices with employees and instructed them to wear respirators (Tr. 268, 270-273, 285; Ex. R10, R11). The purpose was to address the mercury problem and protect the employees (Tr. 272). On one occasion Atkins was not wearing his respirator and Hamby advised him of the company policy (Tr. 174, 273; Ex. R11).

To alleviate the mercury problem Cyprus also hired D'Appalona, a mercury clean-up company. They used sulfur dust, an industrial vacuum cleaner and sponges to clean-up the ADR in June (Tr. 280; Ex. R12).

In June 1982 Cyprus also ordered a new ventilation system. It was installed in the ADR in August 1982 (Tr. 296).

In a performance report of July 6, 1982, Hamby rated Atkins unsatisfactory in hygiene, safety, housekeeping, willingness to work, dependability, attendance and initiative (Tr. 275, 277; Ex. R13).

Concerning attendance, it was company policy to advise an employee when he had accrued six absences. After missing eight days the employee receives a written warning stating that termination is possible on the tenth absence. Atkins was given a written warning on July 8, 1982, for his eighth absence. Atkins refused to sign the notice because of a disagreement over what constituted an excused absence (Tr. 276; Ex. R22).

Atkins' doctor said he couldn't be exposed to chemicals so he couldn't be placed back in the ADR (Tr. 289).
On July 15, 1982, Atkins refused to go into the ADR. He wanted a doctor's approval to return to work (Tr. 263, 290). He was terminated because he refused to work in the ADR (Tr. 289, 290). Hamby claimed the ADR was a safe place to work (Tr. 289, 290).

James M. Appelberg, the supervisor of office services for Cyprus, participated in the decision to fire Atkins (Tr. 299, 301).

According to Appelberg, Atkins requested a transfer to utility from ADR because mercury contamination and ammonia vapors were causing him diminished sight in one eye, sinus and nose problems, as well as inflammation of the lungs (Tr. 301). They had several conversations regarding the transfer. Dr. Badshah's note indicated he should not work in a chemical environment (Tr. 301, 302, 312). Atkins was unwilling to take a cut in pay. An MSHA representative recommended that Atkins be kept at his present level of pay (Tr. 301-304).

Atkins worked on the utility crew for three days then he went back to the ADR for a day shift. He returned to the ADR because the Cyprus supervisor in Denver stated Atkins would have to take an appropriate cut in pay if he remained on utility work (Tr. 303). In the period of July 13th to July 15th Appelberg expressed his opinion to Atkins that the ADR had not been determined to be a hazardous place to work. Atkins concern was to get himself out of the ADR because of the chemical vapors (Tr. 304, 305).

On July 15, Appelberg advised Atkins in a typed note that he (Atkins) had been given a physical exam on June 10th by Dr. Givens and approved to work in the ADR plant. The note further stated that since he continued to refuse to do his assigned work "you leave us no alternative but to terminate your employment" (Tr. 305; Ex. R24). Atkins' final options were to go on disability, NIC (Nevada Industrial Commission), or remain as ADR plant foreman. Appelberg indicated it would not be a job related illness (Tr. 304, 313, 316). Atkins replied something to the effect of "OK, fire me" (Tr. 305).

At the time of the termination Atkins wrote on the termination notice that he would work in the ADR if the company doctor would examine him and state in a letter that he was physically able to work in the mill atmosphere (Tr. 305, 306; Ex. R24). In his handwritten reply Atkins further referred to the letter of June 30, 1982, and stated that his doctor (Badshah) had found colon colitis and further found that chemicals were aggravating his condition. In addition, he could not stand the smell of ammonia in the ADR. The ammonia smell and the mercury in the plant had not been corrected (Ex. R24).
Appelberg replied that Atkins had been cleared for work by a company doctor five weeks before. Further, MSHA had abated the citations in the ADR, so there was no proven health problem (Tr. 305, 306). Prior to the termination Appelberg had received a note (1 July 1982) from Dr. Givens stating, in part, that he had not advised Atkins to consult outside medical help. Further, he told Atkins that the company would assume no financial obligation for his self procured medical attention (Tr. 306; Ex. R20).

Dr. Givens, in a telephone conversation, told Appelberg that he did not find that Atkins had been contaminated by mercury. In addition, Atkins should be able to perform his duties as plant working foreman (Tr. 307).

During conversations between July 1st and 15th Atkins claimed he had miner's rights in that he would not have to take a pay cut if he was transferred to utility. An MSHA representative said the easiest approach was to transfer him to utility at his current pay (Tr. 307, 308). According to Appelberg, Atkins assertion of his miner's rights did not enter into the decision to terminate him (Tr. 308).

Atkins was earning $11.97 an hour as a working foreman compared with $9.33 as a utility worker (Tr. 309, 310).

Appelberg testified that Joseph Legace had worked in the ADR for about two months. He filed a workmen's compensation claim alleging mercury contamination. The claim was disallowed (Tr. 310).

Sharon Badger, chief of benefit services for the State of Nevada Industrial Insurance System, indicated the state agency accepted Atkins' claim on September 17, 1982. On that day Atkins was placed on temporary total disability that was back dated to July 9, 1982. Atkins received travel benefits and, in addition, he was paid $8,226.16 ($38.44 a day x 214 days). He was also sent to Parnassus Heights Disability Consultants for a comprehensive integrated workup by medical specialists. The consultants were paid $6,753.23 for their services (Tr. 155-159).

The disability evaluation by the Parnassus Consultants including psychological, neuropsychological and psychiatric examinations, "revealed that the patient's clinical picture warranted a diagnosis of Schizophrenia, Paranoid type. This type of illness is considered virtually independent of environmental etiology and is, therefore, not industrial in origin." (Ex. R32).

Atkins status under temporary total disability was terminated on the basis of the Parnassus report. NIC's last payment was February 7, 1983 (Tr. 80-81, 153-159; Ex. R32).

The vast majority of cases arising under Section 105(c) of the Mine Act concern matters of safety. However, the Commission applied the above legal analysis in Rosalie Edwards v. Aaron Mining, Inc., 5 FMSHRC 2035 (1983), a case involving unsanitary toilet facilities.

In his post-trial brief Atkins asserts that his request for a transfer was a protected activity within the meaning of Section 101(a)(7) of the Act; further, that he had a reasonable good faith belief that the conditions in the ADR plant constituted a threat to his safety or health; finally, that Cyprus' termination of Atkins was motivated by Atkins' protected activity.

We will initially consider whether a request for a transfer is a protected activity. In this regard Atkins relies on Section 101(a)(7) of the Act which provides as follows:

(7) Any mandatory health or safety standard promulgated under this subsection shall prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of warning as are necessary to insure that miners are apprised of all hazards to which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and appropriate emergency treatment, and proper conditions and precautions safe use or exposure. Where appropriate, such mandatory standard shall also prescribe suitable protective equipment and control or technological procedures to be used in connection with such hazards and shall provide for monitoring or measuring miner exposure at such locations and intervals, and in such manner so as to assure the maximum protection of miners. In addition, where appropriate, any such mandatory standard shall prescribe the type and frequency of medical examinations or other tests which shall be made available, by the operator at his cost, to miners exposed to such hazards in order to most effectively determine whether the health of such miners is adversely affected by such exposure. Where appropriate, the mandatory standard shall provide that where a determination is made that a miner may
suffer material impairment of health or functional ca-
pacity by reason of exposure to the hazard covered by
such mandatory standard, that miner shall be removed from
such exposure and reassigned. Any miner transferred as a
result of such exposure shall continue to receive com-
pensation for such work at no less than the regular rate
of pay for miners in the classification such miner held
immediately prior to his transfer. In the event of the
transfer of a miner pursuant to the preceding sentence,
increases in wages of the transferred miner shall be
based upon the new work classification. In the event
such medical examinations are in the nature of research,
as determined by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, such examinations may be furnished at the ex-
pense of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
The results of examinations or tests made pursuant to
the preceding sentence shall be furnished only to the
Secretary or the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, and, at the request of the miner, to his de-
signated physician.

Atkins' particularly relies on the underlined portion of
Section 101(a)(7).

Atkins states there has not been any standard published
pursuant to Section 101(a)(7). However, he argues that the only
applicable standard in this factual situation is the threshold
limit value (TLV) for mercury adopted in 1973 by the American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists as contained in
30 C.F.R. § 55.5-1 (now recodified at 30 C.F.R. 56.5001).

Atkins has misconstrued the scope of the Mine Act. By its
very terms under § 105(c) the miners particularly protected are
those miner's that are the subject of medical evaluations and
potential transfer under a standard published pursuant to Section
101. There are no medical evaluations or potential transfers now
contemplated within the terms of the TLV for mercury, 30 C.F.R.
§ 56.5001. Accordingly, the above regulation cannot be held
applicable.

The Commission recently ruled that a miner may state a cause
of action under Section 105(c)(1) if he is the subject of medical
evaluations and potential transfers under such a standard
published by the Secretary. Goff v. Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal
Company, 7 FMSHRC 1776 (November 1985). But there was no
indication in the decision that the Commission intended to extend
the doctrine any further than to encompass those situations where
the Secretary specifically addressed, by his rulemaking
authority, the issues of medical evaluations and transfers.
Compare the Secretary's extensive standards at 30 C.F.R., Part 90
involving miners who have evidence of the development of pneumo-
coniosis as involved in Goff.
Atkins' brief further asserts that the statutory right to a transfer combined with his good faith reasonable belief that the conditions in the ADR plant constituted a threat to his safety or health. Atkins claims that he was suffering ill-effects to his health due to mercury contamination in the ADR plant. This conclusion is urged on the basis of certain facts:

First, coworkers Legace and Bowers had been diagnosed as having mercury poisoning in the Cyprus refinery. Further, Legace had described his symptoms in detail to Atkins.

Secondly, Atkins' quantitative urinalysis, taken at Legace's suggestion, revealed a level of 65 mcg/24 hours. Atkins was alarmed because 0-20 mcg/24 hours is considered normal but 65 mcg is still within the state's guidelines.

Thirdly, Atkins knew the atmospheric conditions in the ADR violated the MSHA TLV standards for mercury. Atkins had been with the MSHA inspectors when he monitored the mercury levels in the ADR. Atkins had seen the mercury in the tanks. He also knew the citations issued by Inspector Seale were not posted by Cyprus, hence, he knew the company was not being candid with its employees.

Fourth, Atkins' family doctor, Dr. Badshah, examined and treated him for his headaches, sinus and breathing problems, gastroenteropathy and spastic colon. Dr. Badshah told Atkins he thought the health problems were related to exposure to mercury vapor in the Cyprus mine. Dr. Badshah subsequently wrote a note for the plant manager, Jim Leveaux. Atkins then based his request for transfer to the utility crew on Dr. Badshah's advice.

Atkins' claim lacks merit. The first four incidents he relies on occurred several months before he was terminated. Specifically, the Legace/Bowers conversations took place in April 1982. The quantitative urinalysis was in the same month. The TLV excursion for mercury was in May 1982. The Badshah medical reports relate to previous alleged exposures.

Atkins certainly may have had a reasonable basis of concern for his health. But the pivotal issue is whether he had a reasonable good faith belief that the work he refused to do on July 15, 1982, was hazardous to his health at or about that time. Bush v. Union Carbide, 5 FMSHRC 993 (1983).

A careful study of the record causes me to conclude that no credible evidence supports Atkins' reasonable belief that the ADR was hazardous on or about July 15, 1982.
On the contrary, Atkins' evidence establishes that the ADR was safe. Particularly, Atkins indicated that corrective measures were taken by Cyprus between May 4 and June 15. These measures included fume surveys, mercury testing of the atmosphere, and the use of respirators (Tr. 223, 224). Further, after the MSHA citations the company attempted to cleanup the plant and, according to Atkins, Cyprus took care of the problem "to a great degree" (Tr. 65). In addition, on June 9, 1982, complete blood and urine tests failed to confirm mercury poisoning (Tr. 202-204).

When he was asked about the conditions in the ADR on July 15, 1982, Atkins said that he "believed the levels were close to acceptable." Further, the ADR "could have been perfectly safe at that time" (Tr. 108, 109).

Finally, Dr. Badshah's note of July 9, 1982, written for Atkins, addresses his physical conditions. It does not establish the conditions in the ADR at or about mid-July.

On his termination notice (Ex. C21, R24) Atkins wrote that he would work in the ADR if the company doctor said he was physically able to work in the mill atmosphere. His stated reason was that he could not stand the smell of ammonia. In addition, he asserts the ammonia and the merc (mercury) had not been corrected (Ex. R24).

I do not find the statements concerning the mercury to be credible. At the hearing, when speaking of Exhibit R24, Atkins stated "[t]he mercury was not a problem" (Tr. 112, 113).

For the foregoing reasons Atkins refusal to work was not a protected activity.

Cyprus at all times asserted that the ADR was a safe place to work at or about July 15th. But, since Atkins was not engaged in an activity protected by the Act, it is not necessary to examine respondent's evidence.

Briefs

Counsel have filed detailed briefs which have been most helpful in analyzing the record and defining the issues. I have reviewed and considered these excellent briefs. However, to the extent they are inconsistent with this decision, they are rejected.

Conclusions of Law

Based on the entire record and the factual findings made in the narrative portion of this decision, I enter the following conclusions of law:

1. The Commission has jurisdiction to decide this case.
2. Respondent did not discriminate against complainant in violation of Section 105(c) of the Act.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions of law, I enter the following order:

The Complaint of discrimination filed herein is dismissed.

John J. Morris
Administrative Law Judge

Distribution:

Mary Gray Holt, Esq., Jolles, Sokol & Bernstein, 721 Southwest Oak Street, Portland, OR 97205 (Certified Mail)

John F. Murtha, Esq., Woodburn, Wedge, Blakey & Jeppsen, One East First Street, Reno NV 89505 (Certified Mail)

/blc